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Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination:
An Argument Against Neutrality
Kim Yuracko
Abstract
Title VII prohibits discrimination whereby women or men are denied employment
opportunities because of their status as such. Much of the employment discrimi-
nation taking place today, however, targets not all women or men, but only those
with particular traits or characteristics - for example, women who are aggressive
or men who are effeminate. This article addresses the question of when, if ever,
trait discrimination is actionable sex discrimination under Title VII. The dominant
response advocated by scholars has been to require employers to act in a rigid and
formalistically sex-neutral manner toward their employees. If an employer allows
female employees to wear dresses, the employer must allow male employees to
wear dresses as well. To do otherwise is actionable sex discrimination. This paper
suggests a new response to trait discrimination that returns to Title VII’s original
focus on ending status-based hierarchy. The power/access approach advocated in
this paper treats trait discrimination as actionable sex discrimination only when
it stems from gender norms and scripts that are themselves incompatible with
sex equality in the workplace. The paper contends, in contrast to most current
argument, that rigid sex neutrality is neither required by Title VII nor socially
desirable.
 
 
TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION: 
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST NEUTRALITY 
 
Kimberly A. Yuracko* 
 
 
Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
many jobs in America were formally sex-segregated.1  
Employers openly and unabashedly excluded women from 
desirable high paying jobs reserved for men.2  The story of 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor being unable to find a law firm 
job other than as a legal secretary after graduating at the top 
of her class from Stanford Law School in 1952 is now well-
                                                 
*  Assistant Professor Northwestern University School of Law.  I am 
grateful to Larry Alexander, Ron Allen, Michael Barsa, Cynthia Bowman, 
David Dana, Shari Diamond, Mark Kelman, Andy Koppelman, Jim 
Lindgren, Sai Prakash, and Max Schanzenbach for comments and 
suggestions on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to Mary Anne Case who, 
while disagreeing with much of this article, graciously encouraged me to 
strengthen my arguments.  I received very helpful comments from 
participants at the Northwestern Law School faculty workshop, the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School faculty workshop, and the 
Midwest Political Science Association panel on Gender and Law.  I am 
thankful to the Northwestern University School of Law Summer Faculty 
Research Program for its generous support.  Finally I would like to thank 
my research assistants Crystina Coats and Karen Housler, and my 
library liason Marcia Lehr for their excellent assistance.  I dedicate this 
article to the memory of Susan Moller Okin, a brilliant and bold person I 
was fortunate to know as a teacher, mentor and friend. 
1  See SHARON WHITNEY, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: THE HISTORY 
AND THE MOVEMENT 20 (1984);  DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: 
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 58 (1989). 
2  Diane Bridge describes, for example, a Westinghouse manual from the 
early 1900’s which provided that: “the lowest paid male job was not [to] 
[sic] be paid a wage below that of the highest paid female job, regardless 
of the job content and value to the firm.”   She also quotes the 
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union contract from 1913 which 
limited women to the less skilled jobs and provided that “the highest 
paid female could not earn more than the lowest paid male.”  See Diane 
L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping: Historical and Legal 
Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 581 (1997). 
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known and almost quaintly anachronistic.3  Her experience, 
however, was typical of the time.4   
 Indeed, private discrimination was in some cases 
required by state law.  “By the mid-1960’s 26 states 
prohibited women from working in certain jobs and 19 states 
had hours regulations for women workers.”5  Women were 
statutorily excluded from jobs that required heavy lifting6 as 
well as from work as diverse as tending bar,7 shining shoes, 
and legislative service.8  Society viewed men as primary 
labor market participants and primary wage earners.  
Society viewed women as peripheral market participants 
and supplemental wage earners seeking “pin money.”9   
                                                 
3  See Women’s History Month Biography, Sandra Day O’Connor at 
http://www.gale.com/free_resources/whm/bio/oconnor_s.htm; see 
also Mary Jo White, Remarks: The 2002 Sandra Day O’Connor Medal of 
Honor Recipient, 26 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE J. 263, 266 (2002). 
4  See Barbara Allen Babcock, Forward: A Real Revolution, 49 U. KANSAS L. 
REV. 719, 721 (2001) (describing the “open and rank discrimination” 
faced by female lawyers when she graduated from Yale Law School in 
1963).  See also RHODE, supra note __ at 55 (noting that “[a]n extensive 
survey of law school graduates and administrators in the mid-1960’s 
reported almost two thousand separate occasions on which employers 
had disclosed policies against hiring women”).  
5  KAREN J. MASCHKE, LITIGATION, COURTS AND WOMEN WORKERS 5 
(1989). 
6 See Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive, 416 F.2d 711, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1969) 
(referring to state laws excluding women from jobs which require lifting 
heavy weights); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co. 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 
1968) (ruling on a post Title VII challenge to California’s “hours and 
weights legislation” which barred women from jobs involving lifting of 
certain weights). 
7  See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a Michigan statute 
prohibiting women from tending bar unless they were the wives or 
daughters of male owners). 
8  RHODE, supra note __ at 44 (explaining that “[d]uring the late 
nineteenth century, legislatures began passing an increasing volume of 
exclusionary laws, and by mid-twentieth century, women in half the 
states were banned from work ranging from shining shoes to legislative 
service”). 
9  See WHITNEY, supra note __ at 14 (noting that in the Great Depression 
“the myth that most women were working simply to earn ‘pin money’ 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15
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It was in this social climate that Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was passed.  Much has been made of the 
fact that “sex” was introduced into the Civil Rights Act one 
day before its passage in the House by a Southern 
representative who was strongly opposed to the Act.10  
Indeed, it is often said that the amendment to include sex as 
a protected category was proposed as a last ditch attempt to 
kill the Act.11  While this may have been the motive of some 
of the amendment’s sponsors, the push to include sex in the 
Civil Rights Act was not some spontaneous joke.  It was in 
many ways the culmination of 40 years worth of attempts to 
pass a Constitutional amendment guaranteeing women 
equal rights.12  Statements made on the floor of the House by 
supporters of the sex discrimination amendment make clear 
that they intended the prohibition to end the blanket 
                                                                                                             
for luxuries took over.  Only men were recognized as legitimate 
breadwinners, and twenty-six state legislatures passed laws forbidding 
employers to hire married women”). 
10  The amendment to include sex in the Act was introduced by 
Representative Howard Smith, a conservative representative from 
Virginia who opposed the Civil Rights Act.   Although Smith opposed 
the Civil Rights Act he had been a prior sponsor of the Equal Rights 
Amendment for women.  See Bridge, supra note __ at 610; RHODE, supra 
note __ at 57.  See also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th 
Cir. 1982);  Note, Sex Discrimination, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1166, 1167 (1971).   
11  See WHITNEY, supra note __ at 19 (opining that “[i]n an effort to defeat 
[Title VII] . . ., a group of conservative southern representatives added 
the word ‘sex’ to the list [of prohibited characteristics].  They figured if 
women’s rights were coupled with black civil rights, the bill would be 
such a joke it would fail”). 
12  As Katherine Franke has noted, there was a record of congressional 
thinking about the employment rights of women stemming from 
Congress’ consideration of prior sex equality legislation beginning with 
the introduction of the first Equal Rights Amendment Act in Congress in 
1923.  See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination 
Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14-24 
(1995).  See also UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1964 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] 3224 (testimony of 
Representative May that an equal rights for women amendment had 
been proposed in the House since 1923). 
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exclusion of women from jobs and to dismantle the sex-
based hierarchy of the work world that such exclusion 
maintained.13     
Title VII has been extremely effective at ending 
formal sex segregation.14  Discrimination rarely these days 
                                                 
13  Representative Griffiths argued that without including protections for 
sex in the Act women would continue to populate lower paid jobs and be 
excluded from better jobs reserved for men.  See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note __ at 3210.  Moreover she argued that the prohibition of sex 
discrimination was needed to eradicate states’ protective legislation that 
only served to entrench women’s subordinate employment position.  
Griffith’s argued that “some protective legislation was to safeguard the 
health of women. But it should have safeguarded the health of men, also.  
Most of the so-called protective legislation has really been to protect 
men’s rights in better paying jobs.”  Id. at 3219.  Similarly, Representative 
St. George argued in favor of the amendment as a way to challenge 
restrictive protective labor laws that prevented “women from going into 
the higher salary brackets.”  Id. at 3221.  St George explained: “Women 
are protected—they cannot run an elevator late at night and that is when 
the pay is higher.  They cannot serve in restaurants and cabarets at 
night—when the tips are higher—and the load . . . is lighter.”  Id. at 3221.  
See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976) (Brennan, J. 
dissenting) (arguing that the primary purpose of Title VII was “to assure 
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those 
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially[or 
sexually] stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority [or 
female] citizens”); Int’l Bd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
364 (1977) (noting that “a primary objective of Title VII is . . .  to achieve 
equal employment opportunities and to remove the barriers that have 
operated to favor white male employees over other employees”); Franks 
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 767 (1976) (explaining that the goal 
of Title VII was to “prohibit all practices in whatever form which create 
inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis 
of race, religion, sex, or national origin”). 
14  See e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 
(5th Cir. 1969) (holding that the employer’s policy of refusing to hire 
women for “switchman” positions violated Title VII); Diaz v. Pan 
American, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that airline’s policy against 
hiring men for flight attendant positions violated Title VII); Rosenfeld v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding company policy 
against hiring women for positions involving physically strenuous work 
violated Title VII); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 
1969) (holding that employer cannot bar women from all jobs requiring 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15
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takes the form of a per se refusal to hire women (or men) 
because of their sex—what I refer to as ontological 
discrimination.15  The discrimination that remains is more 
subtle, nuanced, and often far less categorical.  An employer 
may be perfectly willing to hire women or men but may 
simply refuse to hire women or men with particular traits. I 
refer to this as trait discrimination.  Trait discrimination may 
be either sex-neutral or sex-specific.  An employer may, for 
example, simply have a neutral requirement against hiring 
anyone with a particular trait, e.g. a pierced tongue.  
Alternatively, an employer may find a particular trait 
disqualifying only in individuals of one sex, e.g. crew cuts 
on women, long hair on men.   Title VII analyzes sex-neutral 
trait discrimination using the disparate impact framework 
but does not provide a framework for analyzing sex-specific 
trait discrimination.   
Once discrimination shifts from being ontological and 
categorical in nature to being based on more complicated 
interactions of traits plus sex—resulting in neither the total, 
nor perhaps even disproportionate, exclusion of either sex 
from particular jobs—it becomes far more difficult to know 
how to respond.  Discrimination by which all women are 
excluded because they are women is easy to condemn, if not 
                                                                                                             
lifting of more than 35 pounds); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 
(9th Cir. 1981) (holding that employer could not refuse to hire women for 
management positions dealing with foreign clients based on a concern 
that such clients would react negatively to dealing with a female 
executive).  See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on 
Human Relations, 913 U.S. 376 (1973) (holding that newspaper could not 
carry help wanted ads in sex designated columns).  For a discussion of 
the limited instances in which formally sex-based hiring continues see 
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining 
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004). 
15  Ontology means the study of being.  See JOHN H. KOK, PATTERNS OF 
THE WESTERN MIND 4 (1998); ROLLO MAY, THE DISCOVERY OF BEING: 
WRITINGS IN EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY 91 (19983).  I use the term 
ontological discrimination to refer to discrimination that is status-based 
in the most basic sense—all women or all men are excluded because of 
their status as such. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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to eliminate.  It is clear that such discrimination violates Title 
VII.  What is much less clear is how to treat discrimination 
by employers that affects only particular women (or men) 
rather than women (or men) as a group.  Consider the 
employer who regularly hires women but simply refuses to 
hire women with short hair, or the employer who regularly 
hires men by simply refuses to hire men with long hair.  The 
essential question of this paper is when, if ever, does such 
sex-specific trait discrimination constitute actionable sex 
discrimination under Title VII? 16     
My purpose is primarily positive and descriptive.  
Yet, the account I provide of when sex-specific 
discrimination is actionable is based not solely or even 
primarily on the text of Title VII—which is itself too sparse 
and indeterminate to answer this question17—but instead on 
the legislative history of Title VII’s sex amendment (also 
concededly sparse) and the broader anti-caste goals of Title 
VII’s sex (and race) provision(s).  My argument is not, 
therefore, a broad normative one about the kinds of 
discrimination that are generally socially harmful and 
should be prohibited.  It is, instead, one of statutory 
construction in which normative arguments are narrowly 
focused on fulfilling the law’s own purposes and goals.18 
                                                 
16  Although this paper focuses on the appropriate treatment of sex-
specific forms of trait discrimination challenged under a disparate 
treatment framework, in fact, as will be discussed, the same core 
question of when individuals should be protected in their possession of a 
particular trait drives the analysis of trait discrimination claims under 
both the disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses.  See infra text 
accompanying note __. 
17  Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1).   
18  This paper is part of a larger project and series of papers arguing that 
what antidiscrimination laws require can never be understood or 
defined in the abstract.  What it means to not discriminate on the basis of 
sex can only be understood by looking at the social context in which 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15
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After framing the problem of this paper more fully by 
expanding upon the differences between ontological and 
trait-based discrimination, I assess the approaches to sex-
specific trait discrimination that have been suggested by 
scholars and the courts.  I begin with the approach that 
currently has the broadest support, what I call the “trait 
equality” approach.  According to the trait equality 
approach, an employer engages in actionable sex 
discrimination anytime it penalizes an employee for 
possessing a trait that the employer finds unobjectionable in 
employees of the other sex.  While the trait equality 
approach may at first seem simple and straightforward, it is 
in fact highly subjective and indeterminate.  More 
importantly, even when viewed in its most sympathetic and 
workable form, a trait equality requirement is not necessary 
for substantive sex equality and, in practice, encourages a 
workplace androgyny that has high costs in terms of 
employee and employer liberty. 
I next consider three other responses to the problem 
of trait discrimination.  The “fundamental/immutable trait” 
approach prohibits sex-specific trait discrimination only 
when the trait in question is, or reflects the exercise of, a 
fundamental right—such as marital or parental status—or an 
immutable characteristic—such as height.  The “group-
identity” approach makes trait discrimination actionable 
only when the trait at issue is integral to the employee’s 
identity as a member of the protected group.  The 
“mechanism of harm” approach focuses, unlike the other 
approaches, not on the nature of the trait for which 
particular women or men are being singled out for adverse 
                                                                                                             
challenged behavior occurs and by focusing on the substantive social 
goals driving a particular antidiscrimination statute.   
Nondiscrimination, in other words, is necessarily context-based and 
informed by substantive social goals.  See generally Kimberly A. Yuracko, 
One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality 
Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible? 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 731 (2003); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: 
Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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treatment, but on the mechanism by which they are harmed.  
The mechanism of harm approach makes actionable only 
trait-based adverse treatment that is sexual in nature.  All 
three approaches, while suffering from a range of different 
problems, suffer from the common flaw of being fatally 
underinclusive.  All permit forms of sex-specific trait 
discrimination which reinforce the very sex-based work-
world hierarchy that Title VII was intended to dismantle.   
In the final section of the paper, I present an 
alternative response which I call the power/access approach.  
This approach treats sex-specific trait discrimination as 
actionable sex discrimination if the gender norms driving 
the discrimination are ones that society has an equality-
based interest in eliminating.  Consider, for example, the 
gender norm that makes aggressive women look bitchy.  An 
employer may have no objection to hiring women generally 
but may refuse to hire aggressive women while not objecting 
to, and perhaps even prizing, aggressive men.  Given how 
important aggressiveness is for business and professional 
success, if employers are permitted to discriminate against 
aggressive women, then women generally will be impaired 
in their ability to move up the corporate ranks and fully 
integrate the work world.  Equality for women in the 
workplace requires the breakdown, or at least 
nonenforcement, of the gender norm associating female 
aggressiveness with bitchiness.  Yet, not all gender norms 
are created equal.  Not all reinforce sex hierarchy in this way 
and not all need to be eliminated in order for women and 
men to compete on equal footing in the workplace.  The 
power/access approach makes actionable those, and only 
those, types of sex-specific trait discrimination that arise out 
of gender norms and gender scripts that reinforce sex 
hierarchy in the workplace.  This approach cures the under 
and over inclusiveness problems of the other approaches by 
focusing squarely on Title VII’s substantive goals and 
recognizing that what nondiscrimination means is 
necessarily socially contingent and context specific.   
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15
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Ultimately, this paper argues that Title VII’s 
nondiscrimination mandate requires both more and less 
than the formal equality and rigid neutrality that is currently 
argued for most often.  It requires more in that it demands 
not only formal access to the world for women, but also a 
change in the social norms and gender scripts that make it 
more difficult for women to compete effectively in the work 
world.  It requires less in that it does not require the 
elimination of, or blindness to, gender in all instances.  The 
social transformation Title VII requires is actually more 
radical and more difficult than that of rigid gender-blind 
neutrality.  It is also, however, far more appealing.   
 
I. Ontological vs. Trait-Based Discrimination  
 Title VII prohibits employment discrimination that is 
because of an individual’s sex. 19   At the most basic level 
Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to refuse to hire or 
promote women (or men) because of their status as such.20  I 
refer to such status-based decision making as ontological 
discrimination. 
 Not all ontological discrimination looks the same.  
Efforts to exclude or disadvantage women (or men) may be 
motivated by different goals and effected through different 
mechanisms.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19  See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1).   
20  See Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(“[T]he term sex should be given the traditional definition based on 
anatomical characteristics”); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 
1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (“We have stated that ‘[t]he phrase in Title VII 
prohibiting discrimination based on sex’ means that ‘it is unlawful to 
discriminate against women because they are women and against men 
because they are men.’  In other words, Congress intended the term ‘sex,’ 
to mean ‘biological male or biological female’”) (internal citation 
omitted).   
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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Ontological Discrimination 
 
Motives 
Exclusion Satisfy Customer Preferences  
 
 
Non Sexual Means 
 
Mechanism 
Blanket prohibition on 
hiring women (or men) 
Sex-based hiring requirements 
in order to satisfy customers' 
preferences to work with 
women (men) 
 
 
Sexual Means 
Sexual harassment of all 
women (or men) in 
workplace 
Sex based hiring in order to 
sell customers a particular type 
of sexual titillation 
 
As the figure above illustrates, sex-based ontological 
discrimination may most obviously be motivated by the 
employer’s desire to exclude women (or men) from the 
workplace either because of animus or because of a belief 
that women (or men) simply do not belong in certain 
settings.21  Alternatively, ontological discrimination may be 
motivated not by the employer’s own bias but by customer 
preferences.  An employer may engage in ontological 
discrimination only because such discrimination is needed 
to satisfy the demands of its customers. 
 Ontological discrimination motivated by the 
employer’s desire to exclude may, moreover, be effected 
through either non sexual or sexual means.  An employer 
                                                 
21  The employer’s desire to exclude may reflect not only the biases of 
owner and management, but also a desire to cater to the biases of one’s 
workers. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15
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may simply exercise a formal or informal policy of not hiring 
women (or men) to certain jobs.22  Alternatively, an 
employer may attempt to exclude women (or men) by 
encouraging or condoning sexual harassment of all women 
(or men) who try to hold certain jobs.23   
 Ontological discrimination motivated by a desire to 
satisfy customer preferences may be effected by similar 
means.  An employer may simply refuse to hire women (or 
men) because it is trying to provide a particular kind of 
gendered, albeit non-sexual, ambience,24 or because its 
customer base is more comfortable working with women (or 
                                                 
22  See BARBARA F. RESKIN AND HEIDI I. HARTMANN, eds., WOMEN’S WORK, 
MEN’S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 47-50 (1986) (presenting 
numerous examples of formal discrimination against women in 
employment).  See also Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 1980) 
(describing formal policies of discrimination against women held by the 
Toledo, Ohio police department and in effect both before and after Title 
VII); Thompson v. Boyle, 499 F. Supp., 1147, 1150, 1161-62 (D.D.C. 1979) 
(describing formal practices of exclusion and segregation of women in 
the bookbinding industry). 
23  See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (“’Sexual 
harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for 
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at 
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality’”) (citation 
omitted); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1496, 1498 (M.D. 
Fla. 1991) (women workers were subjected to pornography, sexual 
comments, physical touching and being told the men did not want to 
work with them); Hall v. Gus Const. Co. Inc., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(women on road construction crew targeted for harassment of sexual 
and non sexual nature because they were women).  See also Carol 
Kleiman, Harassment Suit at Stroh Brewery Puts Focus on Company’s Own 
Ads, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1992, at 6 (describing lawsuit brought by female 
workers at Stroh’s bottling plant alleging that female workers were 
subjected to physical and verbal harassment of both a sexual and non 
sexual nature aimed at excluding women from the workplace).  
24  See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab., Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(practice of hiring male only food servers in order to maintain 
restaurant's "Old World" ambience was evidence of disparate treatment 
discrimination in violation of Title VII) 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 
 
TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX  DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
 
 12
men) in particular situations.25  Alternatively, an employer 
may require that its workers provide sexual titillation to 
customers and hire only female or male employees 
accordingly.26   
 The EEOC Guidelines interpreting Title VII's 
prohibition on sex discrimination explicitly prohibit sex-
based hiring in order to satisfy customer preferences.27  In 
practice, however, discrimination of this sort is often 
permitted in two types of cases: those in which sex 
discrimination is necessary in order to protect customers' 
privacy interests and those in which sex discrimination is 
necessary in order to provide customers with sexual 
titillation where sexual titillation is the employer's only or 
                                                 
25  See Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(policy of hiring women only as flight attendants on grounds that 
passengers preferred female flight attendants violated Title VII); 
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (challenging 
employer’s argument that being male was a requirement for the position 
of Vice President of International Operations because Latin American 
clients would react negatively to a woman in this position); Olsen v. 
Marriott International Inc., 75 F. Supp.2d 1052 (1999) (challenging 
employer’s policy of favoring female massage therapists in hiring 
because of customers’ preferences for female over male therapists); 
EEOC v. Hi Corp., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (involving a 
challenge to a weight loss center’s policy of hiring only female weight 
loss counselors on the grounds that customers overwhelmingly 
preferred to work with female as opposed to male counselors). 
26  See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) 
(hiring only women to high customer contact positions of flight 
attendant and ticket agent in order to provide sexual titillation to 
predominately male customer base); Guardian Capital Corp. v. New York 
State Division of Human Rights, 360 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1974)  (hiring only 
female food servers in order to provide customers with sexualized 
female gaze objects as well as food). 
27  The EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex provide: 
"(a)(1)   The Commission will find that the following situations do not 
warrant the application of the bona fide occupational qualification 
exception . . .  
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the 
preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers . . . .” 
29 C.F.R. 1604.2(a). 
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primary good for sale.28  Courts permit such discrimination, 
and avoid Title VII’s prohibition on ontological 
discrimination, by concluding that sex is a bona fide 
occupational qualification for the position at issue.29  
Notwithstanding this relatively narrow exception, however, 
ontological discrimination was Title VII’s paradigmatic 
target.30  
 Sometimes, though, an employer does not seek to 
exclude all women or all men from a particular position but 
only those with particular traits or attributes.  The exclusion 
may be sex-neutral if the employer simply refuses to hire 
any woman or man with a particular trait—e.g. tattoos or 
blue hair.  The exclusion becomes sex-specific, however, if 
the employer enforces a hiring requirement on one sex but 
not the other, e.g. women may not look masculine, men may 
not act feminine.     
                                                 
28  For a fuller discussion of the exceptions to Title VII's prohibition on 
sex discrimination driven by customer preferences for privacy and 
sexual titillation see Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies, supra 
note __. 
29  Title VII includes an exception to its general antidiscrimination 
mandate which permits discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, or 
national origin in “instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or enterprise.”  Title VII Section 
703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)(1)(1998). 
30  The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., explained:  
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is 
plain from the language of the statute.  It was to achieve 
equality of employment opportunities and remove 
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over other 
employees. 
Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).  The Court then emphasized that 
“[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is 
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed.” Id. at 431. See also Sex 
Discrimination, 84 HARV. L. REV. at 1170 (noting that “[t]he paradigm case 
of explicit sex discrimination is where sex itself, as a broad generic 
classification, is the sole basis of the action taken by the employer.  Such 
a case occurs when an employer simply refuses to hire women for a 
certain position”);  see also supra  notes 13-14. 
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 Sex-specific trait discrimination, like ontological 
discrimination, may be motivated by either an employer's 
own desire (stemming from animus or a sense of 
inappropriate fit) to exclude women or men with a 
particular trait, or by an employer's desire to satisfy 
customer preferences.  Such trait discrimination may also be 
effected by either sexual or nonsexual mechanisms.  
 
 
Sex – Specific Trait Discrimination 
                                   
Motives 
 Exclusion Satisfy Customer Preferences 
Non Sexual Means Prohibition on hiring some 
subgroup of women (or men)  
Refusal to hire women (or 
men) with certain 
characteristics because of 
customer preferences   
Mechanism 
Sexual Means 
Sexual harassment only of 
women (or men) with 
particular characteristics  
Willingness to hire only 
women (or men) who can 
provide customers with 
sexual titillation  
 
 An employer may, for example, believe that it is 
inappropriate for women with small children to be 
employed full-time and, therefore, may refuse to hire 
women with small children while being willing to hire men 
with small children.31  The trait discrimination is motivated 
by a desire to exclude some subgroup of women because of 
a sense of their inappropriate fit in the workplace, and the 
discrimination itself is effected by nonsexual means--that is 
by direct prohibition.  Alternatively, an employer may not 
like effeminate men while not minding feminine women and 
may condone or participate in the sexualized harassment of 
                                                 
31 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (involving a 
challenge to an employer’s policy of refusing to hire women but not men 
with preschool age children). 
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such men by others in the workplace.32  The discrimination 
is again motivated by a desire to exclude men of a particular 
type, but the means of effecting the exclusion are taunts and 
harassment that are sexual in nature.33   
 An employer may also engage in sex-specific trait 
discrimination in order to satisfy customer preferences.  An 
employer may willingly hire men, for example, but refuse to 
hire men who wear dresses--while not objecting to women 
in dresses--because of a concern that men in dresses will 
alienate and offend customers.34  Alternatively, an employer 
may hire women but only those whom its customers find 
physically and sexually appealing while imposing no similar 
requirements on male employees.35  
 While ontological discrimination is clearly targeted by 
Title VII, and has diminished significantly since its passage, 
the effect of Title VII on sex-specific trait discrimination is 
                                                 
32  See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (man 
working on offshore oil platform was singled out and subject to sexual 
taunts and assaults apparently because he was perceived as 
insufficiently masculine);  Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 
F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001) (male waiter subject to sexual harassment because 
he was judged to be too feminine by his male co-workers); Doe v. City of 
Belleville, IL, 119 F.3d 563 (1997) (teenage brothers singled out for sexual 
harassment by male co-workers because of their perceived effeminacy), 
vacated by 523 U.S 1001 (1998). 
33  It is worth noting that cases of sexual harassment may involve either 
ontological or trait-based discrimination.  
34  See e.g., Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. 
Sept. 16, 2002) (terminating male delivery truck driver who sometimes 
dressed and appeared in public as a woman during his off duty hours on 
the grounds that employer's customers would not approve of such 
behavior).   
35  See e.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(involving a challenge to an airline policy of imposing strict weight 
requirements on female flight attendants as a condition of their 
employment because the employer sought to compete in industry by 
featuring attractive female attendants); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 
366 F. Supp. 763 (D.C.D.C. 1973) (involving a challenge to an employer 
policy of imposing weight requirements and no eyeglass policy on 
female but not male flight attendants). 
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more uncertain.  Courts and scholars have struggled to 
decide whether, and if so when, sex-specific trait 
discrimination violates Title VII’s nondiscrimination 
mandate.   
 
II. Trait Equality Approach 
 Currently, the dominant response to sex-specific trait 
discrimination is to argue that women should be permitted 
to possess any trait or attribute that men are permitted to 
possess in the workplace, and vice versa.  It is sex 
discrimination, the argument goes, for individuals of one sex 
to be disadvantaged for engaging in an activity or 
possessing an attribute that the employer deems perfectly 
acceptable when possessed or engaged in by individuals of 
the other sex.  In this section I describe the scholarly and 
judicial support for this approach before emphasizing its 
conceptual and normative weaknesses.     
 
A. Scholarly Support  
 Mary Anne Case has provided the strongest and most 
articulate defense of the trait equality approach.36  According 
to Case, trait equality both already is, and should be, 
demanded by antidiscrimination law.37  Just as women are 
protected under Title VII from adverse employment actions 
when they adopt the traits and attributes that are considered 
acceptable (or desirable, or required) in men, so too must 
men be protected when they adopt traits and attributes that 
are considered acceptable in women.38  According to Case, 
                                                 
36  See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual 
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 
YALE L. J. 1, 7 (1995).  Case herself, however, does not use this phrase.  
37  Case contends that effeminate men “as well as . . . men who violate 
sex-specific grooming codes by wearing feminine attire to work . . . are 
clearly protected by both the plain language of Title VII and the holding 
in Hopkins.  If their employer tolerates feminine behavior or attire in 
women but not in them, the employer is subjecting them to disparate 
treatment in violation of Title VII.”  Id. at 7.  Case, supra note __ at 7. 
38  See Case, supra note __ at 49. 
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“one need not go beyond the plain language of [Title VII] to 
find explicit protection for [the] . . . hypothetical 'male 
employee who routinely appeared for work in skirts and 
dresses,' at least if the skirts and dresses were of a sort the 
employer did not object to its female employees wearing.'"39   
Case, somewhat hopefully, views the trait equality 
approach as a means of elevating that which has been 
traditionally feminine. 40  “It is my contention,” she explains, 
“that, unfortunately, the world will not be safe for women in 
frilly pink dresses—they will not, for example, generally be 
as respected as either men or women in gray flannel suits—
unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as well.”41 
Case’s desire to elevate the feminine, as opposed to simply 
elevating and protecting women, is odd  given that Case 
both clearly sees the feminine as distinct from femaleness 
and also seems to have no independent attachment to the 
feminine per se. 42   Indeed, Case says: “I would be neither 
particularly surprised nor particularly disappointed if 
masculinity and femininity as we today define them were to 
be amalgamated, to be diversified, or to wither away in 
future generations.”43  Perhaps more odd, however, is her 
optimism in the trait equality approach as a mechanism for 
such elevation.  As Case notes, the trait equality approach 
does not itself require employers to permit men to wear 
                                                 
39  Case, supra note __ at 49. 
40  See Case, supra note __ at 3 (“We are in danger of substituting for 
prohibited sex discrimination a still acceptable gender discrimination, 
that is to say, discrimination against the stereotypically feminine, 
especially when manifested by men, but also when manifested by 
women”). 
41  Id. at 7. 
42  According to Case, “it is important to those feminists who wish to see 
feminine styles more generally valued, rather than gradually eliminated 
as they may be in an androgynous culture slanted toward the masculine, 
that the protections of Title VII be seen as extending even to men in 
dresses.”  Id. at 7. 
43  Id. at 76.  Indeed, Case explains that she worries “about two sorts of 
potential gender essentialism—not merely the essentializing of women 
as feminine, but the essentializing of the feminine itself.”  Id. at 76 
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frilly pink dresses to work, it only requires that if the 
employer allows women to wear such outfits it must allow 
men to do so as well.44  It is highly uncertain, as Case 
acknowledges, that employers bound by the strictures of the 
trait equality approach would respond by expanding the 
clothing and grooming options available to both sexes rather 
than prohibiting everyone from wearing pink frilly dresses.45  
However, even if employers were to respond to a trait 
equality requirement by making gendered clothing and 
grooming styles options for both sexes, it remains far from 
clear that doing so would serve to elevate the traditionally 
feminine as opposed to increasing its marginalization by 
linking in the workplace stereotypically feminine women 
and men in drag.  Nonetheless, despite her perhaps overly 
optimistic instrumental hopes for the trait equality 
approach, Case views the approach as clearly mandated by 
Title VII.    
Taylor Flynn, too, argues in favor of a trait equality 
approach to sex discrimination and interprets it in a 
similarly literalistic way.46  Flynn contends that “a male 
employee fired for wearing an earring should have a claim 
under Title VII because he was discriminated against for 
failing to conform to the masculine gender role expectation 
that men do not accessorize.”47  Flynn sees gender 
nonconformity as at the core of both sex and sexual 
orientation discrimination and sees the trait equality 
                                                 
44  Id. at 7-8.  
45  Case “acknowledge[s] the risks in insisting that employers impose the 
same grooming standards on men and women:  Haunted by the specter 
of a man in a dress, employers may choose to impose a unisex, 
conventionally masculine grooming code on all employees; this would 
not only further reduce employee liberty but also further reinforce the 
supremacy of masculine standards and the decline of the feminine.”  Id 
at 7-8. 
46  See Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include 
Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 394 (2002). 
47  Id. at 401. 
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requirement, again perhaps too optimistically, as a way to 
free gender nonconformists from traditional gender 
expectations. 48       
 
B. Case Law 
 The trait equality approach has also been popular 
with courts, but only up to a point.  The approach has been 
used by courts to target discrimination against masculine 
women and effeminate men.  Courts have been largely 
unwilling, however, to use the approach as a means of 
targeting employment discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or that based on male cross-dressing. 
 
1. Aggressive/Masculine Women 
The trait equality approach was most clearly 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.49  Ann Hopkins had worked in the Washington 
D.C. office of Price Waterhouse for five years when the 
partners in that office proposed her for partnership in 1982.50  
Hopkins was one of 88 persons proposed for partnership 
that year and the only woman.51  The district court judge 
who initially heard Hopkins’ case found that “’[n]one of the 
other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year 
had a comparable record in terms of successfully securing 
major contracts for the partnership.’”52  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
48   Id. at 393.  Katherine Franke, has made a similar argument that 
gender role enforcement is at the core of sex discrimination and should, 
therefore, be the focus of Title VII.  According to Franke, “Title VII 
should recognize the primacy of gender norms as the root of both sexual 
identity and sex discrimination, and thereby the law should prohibit all 
forms of normative gender stereotyping regardless of the biological sex 
of any of the parties involved.”  Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake 
of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U.PA. 
L. REV. 1, 95 (1995). 
49  490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
50  490 U.S. at 233. 
51  490 U.S. at 233.  At the time Hopkins was considered for partner, Price 
Waterhouse had 662 partners of whom 7 were women.  Id. 
52  490 U.S. at 234, quoting district court opinion at 618 F. Supp. at 1112. 
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Hopkins was passed over for partnership and held for 
reconsideration the following year.53 
 The man who was assigned by Price Waterhouse to 
tell Hopkins why her candidacy had been held over 
provided her with several suggestions for improving her 
chances the following year.  He told her she should “’walk 
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more 
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear 
jewelry,’”54  After the partners in her office refused to re-
propose her for the partnership, Hopkins sued alleging that 
she had been discriminated against because of her sex in 
violation of Title VII.55 
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court made clear 
that it was actionable sex discrimination in violation of Title 
VII to penalize an employee for possessing traits or 
attributes that would have been acceptable in individuals of 
the other sex.  The Court held that “an employer who acts on 
the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or 
that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”56  
The Supreme Court described its holding in Price Waterhouse 
as reinforcing Title VII’s prohibition on “gender 
stereotyping,” and the Court had no difficulty concluding 
                                                 
53  Of the 88 people proposed for partnership that year, forty seven were 
admitted to the partnership, twenty one were rejected and twenty were 
held for reconsideration the following year.  Id. at 233.     
54  490 U.S. at 235.  As part of the partnership consideration process, 
several partners at Price Waterhouse submitted comments regarding 
Hopkins’ candidacy. Several of these comments also touched on 
Hopkins’s apparent gender inappropriateness.  “One partner described 
her as ‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a 
woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course at charm school.’  Several 
partners criticized her use of profanity; in response, one partner 
suggested that those partners objected to her swearing only ‘because it’s 
a lady using foul language.’  Another supporter explained that Hopkins 
‘ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed  
mgr to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady ptr 
candidate.’” Id. at 235, internal citations omitted.  
55  490 U.S. at 232. 
56  490 U.S. at 250. 
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that such impermissible gender stereotyping had occurred in 
this case.57 
Despite the Supreme Court’s characterization of its 
holding as prohibiting gender stereotyping, it is more 
precise and more accurate to describe the holding as 
endorsing a trait equality requirement.  The term gender 
stereotyping has been used by courts to refer to and prohibit 
very distinct kinds of biases.  Gender stereotyping 
sometimes refers to the erroneous attribution of traits and 
attributes to a particular individual because of that person’s 
membership in a particular social group.  For example, 
gender stereotyping may refer to the process by which one 
assumes that a particular woman is physically weak, 
uncommitted to her career in the long term, or emotionally 
vulnerable, because these are attributes associated with 
women as a group.58  Courts have, in the employment 
context and in other contexts, repeatedly prohibited gender 
stereotyping of this sort.59  The gender stereotyping the 
                                                 
57  According to the Court, “It takes no special training to discern sex 
stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as 
requiring ‘a course at charm school.’ Nor, . . . .does it require expertise in 
psychology to know that, if an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ 
can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it 
is the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the 
criticism.”  490 U.S. at 256. 
58  See e.g., Grube v. Lau Industries, Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that it is a gender stereotype to assume that women should be 
the primary caregivers in their families); Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric 
Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 134 (3rd Cir. 1996) (noting that historical restrictions on 
women’s ability to hold certain jobs arising from employers’ concern for 
women’s health and well-being were often based on gender stereotypes); 
Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that employer’s 
evaluation of job candidates’ leadership abilities reflected gender 
stereotyped notions about the characteristics likely possessed by women 
and men). 
59  See e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down a 
federal statute providing dependent benefits for spouses of male service 
members but providing the same benefits to the spouses of female 
service members only upon their showing actual dependence for over 
one-half their support); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 
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Court prohibited in Price Waterhouse is, however, entirely 
different.  It involves not the erroneous attribution of group-
associated traits to individual group members, but the 
requirement that individuals actually possess the traits and 
attributes deemed acceptable for their sex rather than those 
deemed acceptable and appropriate for the other sex.  
Referring to a prohibition of this latter type of gender 
stereotyping as a trait equality requirement helps to clarify 
which distinct type of “stereotyping” is in fact at issue.60 
Additionally, “gender stereotyping” does not fully 
capture what the Court found problematic about the 
decision making in Price Waterhouse.   Although the Supreme 
Court boldly stated that “we are beyond the day when an 
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or 
insisting that they matched the stereotypes associated with 
their groups,”61 the conduct the Supreme Court was 
prohibiting was more narrowly defined than this statement 
suggests.  It is unlikely, for example, that the Court meant 
that a bank could not fire a teller who showed up to work in 
a Barney costume on the grounds that doing so 
discriminated against the employee for not matching the 
stereotypes of proper dress associated with her sex.  The 
Court was not intending to hold that adverse employment 
action based on any conduct that deviated from gender 
stereotypes constituted sex-based discrimination.  Rather, 
the Court intended to protect individuals from adverse 
employment actions resulting from their possession of 
attributes that would be acceptable to the employer if 
possessed by individuals of the other sex.  Again, although 
                                                                                                             
(7th Cir. 1971) (striking down the employer’s no marriage rule for female 
but not male flight personnel because based on sex stereotypes about 
women’s domestic role); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a 
state law which, all else being equal, chose men over women to be estate 
executors).  
60  For a fuller discussion of different types of stereotyping see Andrew 
Koppelman, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 131-36 
(1996). 
61  490 U.S. at 251. 
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the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse said it was 
prohibiting gender stereotyping, the decision is better 
thought of as an articulation of a trait equality requirement. 
Lower courts have used Price Waterhouse to provide 
Title VII protection to similarly non gender conforming 
women.  In Heller v. Columbia Edgwater Country Club,62 for 
example, the plaintiff was subjected to a constant barrage of 
insults focused on her perceived gender inappropriate 
clothing and her lesbianism.  Applying the logic of trait 
equality, the court concluded that the harassment Heller 
suffered because of her masculine traits and appearance 
constituted discrimination because of sex.63   
 
2. Effeminate Men 
 The trait equality approach has had its greatest 
impact, however, not in protecting aggressive/masculine 
women but in protecting effeminate men singled out for 
harassment by other men in mixed sex or predominately 
male environments.  Oddly, nowhere in the Supreme 
Court’s 1997 decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services,64 in which it held that same-sex sexual harassment 
could be actionable under Title VII, did the Court rely on or 
even mention the gender stereotyping/trait equality 
approach to sex discrimination outlined in Price Waterhouse.  
                                                 
62  See Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp.2d 1212 (D. 
Or. 2002). 
63  According to the court: “Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, a jury could find that Cagle repeatedly 
harassed (and ultimately discharged) Heller because Heller did not 
conform to Cagle’s stereotype of how a woman ought to behave. . . .  
[T]he impetus for the comments about Heller’s ‘faggy’ shoes was that 
Cagle perceived them to be men’s shoes.  Cagle also allegedly made a 
number of comments along the lines of ‘I thought you were the man,’ ‘I 
thought you wore the pants,’ and asked Heller who ‘w[ore] the dick in 
the relationship.’”  Heller, 195 F. Supp.2d at 1224.  The court also took the  
unusual step of extending the trait equality logic to find actionable 
harassment Heller suffered because of her lesbianism.  Id. at __.   See text 
accompanying note 79.  
64 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1997). 
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The Court in Oncale offered three “evidentiary route[s]”65 by 
which a plaintiff could show that he was discriminated 
against because of sex: first, the plaintiff could show that the 
same-sex harassment was motivated by sexual desire and 
therefore presumably would not have happened to someone 
of the other sex; second, the plaintiff could show that the 
harasser was motivated by general hostility to persons of 
plaintiff’s sex in the workplace; or third, the plaintiff could 
offer direct comparative evidence showing that the harasser 
treated women and men differently in a mixed-sex 
workplace.  While the Supreme Court did not mention the 
gender stereotyping/trait equality rationale of Price 
Waterhouse as a means of finding same sex harassment 
actionable, nor did it refute this approach.  As a result, 
courts continue to apply this approach in order to find at 
least some male-male harassment actionable under Title 
VII.66 
 In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,67 for 
example, the Ninth Circuit applied the trait equality 
approach to conclude that abuse the plaintiff suffered 
constituted actionable sex discrimination under Title VII.  
Antonio Sanchez worked as a host and then food server at 
Azteca restaurants in Washington state.  During his four 
year tenure at Azteca, Sanchez was subjected to a steady 
                                                 
65  Id. at 81. 
66  The reconciling of Oncale and Price Waterhouse by the Third Circuit in 
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, is fairly standard.  
According to the Third Circuit, “[a]bsent an explicit statement from the 
Supreme Court that it is turning its back on Price Waterhouse, there is no 
reason to believe” that the Oncale decision was meant to call the gender 
stereotyping/trait equality theory of sex discrimination into question.  Id. 
at 263 n.5.  But see David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex?  The 
Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1743 
(2002) (“In light of all the ways that a sex-stereotyping theory should 
have come to the Court’s attention, the complete failure of the Oncale 
opinion to address the sex-stereotyping theory of harassment, along with 
its failure to identify sex-stereotyping as an “evidentiary route” for 
proving “because of sex,” is notable and disturbing.”). 
67  256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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stream of taunts and insults focusing on his perceived 
effeminacy.68  At a bench trial, the district court judge held 
that the harassment Sanchez allegedly suffered had not been 
“because of” sex within the meaning of Title VII.  The Court 
of Appeals disagreed.  According to the court, “[a]t its 
essence, the systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a 
belief that Sanchez did not act as a man should act.”69  
Relying on Price Waterhouse, the court concluded that such 
abuse—based as it was on the perception that Sanchez 
possessed traits and attributes that while acceptable for a 
woman were inappropriate for a man—constituted 
harassment “because of” sex.70 
                                                 
68  According to the court, “ [m]ale co-workers and a supervisor 
repeatedly referred to Sanchez in Spanish and English as ‘she’ and ‘her.’  
Male co-workers mocked Sanchez for walking and carrying his serving 
tray ‘like a woman,’ and taunted him in Spanish and English as, among 
other things, a ‘faggot’ and a ‘fucking female whore.’” Nichols, 256 F.3d 
at 870. 
69  Nichols, 256 F.3d 874. 
70  Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875.  The Ninth Circuit faced a similar case one 
year later in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc).  Medina Rene worked as a butler on an exclusive floor of the 
MGM Grand Hotel reserved for wealthy and famous guests.  All of the 
other butlers on the floor were male.  Rene was subjected to a constant 
stream of abuse from his supervisor and fellow butlers.  The conduct 
included “whistling and blowing kisses at Rene, calling him ‘sweetheart’ 
and ‘munea’ (Spanish for ‘doll’), telling crude jokes and giving sexually 
oriented ‘joke’ gifts, and forcing Rene to look at pictures of naked men 
having sex.”  Id. at 1064.  The abuse was also often physical.  Rene was 
“caressed and hugged,” his co-workers would “’touch [his] body like 
they would to a woman,’” and “they grabbed him in the crotch and 
poked their fingers in his anus through his clothing.”  Id. at 1064.  In an 
en banc decision the court held that Rene had stated a claim for sexual 
harassment in violation of Title VII.  In a plurality opinion of the court, 
Judge Fletcher (joined by Judges Trott, Graver and Fisher), concluded 
that the alleged harassment was “because of” sex because of the sexual 
nature of the abuse.  Id. at 1066-68.  In a concurring opinion Judge 
Pregerson (joined by judges Trott and Berzon), reached the same result 
for different reasons.  According to Pregerson, the case was better 
understood as a gender stereotyping case in which Rene was harassed 
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 Similarly, in Doe v. City of Belleville,71 the Seventh 
Circuit ruled that the harassment of two boys who were 
perceived by their male co-workers as insufficiently 
masculine constituted sex discrimination under Title VII. 72  
City of Belleville involved the harassment of two sixteen year 
old brothers working for the City for the summer tending 
the grounds of a municipal cemetery.  Both brothers were 
subjected to taunts and abuse by their male co-workers, but 
one of the brothers, H. Doe, was the main target. 73  The 
                                                                                                             
because he had traits that were deemed appropriate for a woman but not 
a man.  Id. at 1068-69. 
71  Doe v. City of Belleville, IL.,119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).  The Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion in Belleville was vacated by the Supreme Court for 
further consideration in light of its decision in Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services.  The case then settled before there was a decision on 
remand.  Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263 n.5 (3rd 
Cir. 2001).  The Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale did not, however, 
directly challenge or retract the gender stereotyping logic set forth in 
Price Waterhouse on which the Belleville decision relied.  See id. (opining 
that “there was nothing in Oncale, . . . that would call into question” the 
holding in Belleville that harassment based on failure to live up to gender 
stereotypes was sex discrimination).     
72  The Circuit Court noted: “The Supreme Court’s decision in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, . . . makes clear that Title VII does not permit an 
employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or 
conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender roles.”  Belleville, 119 
F.3d at 580.  The court also suggested, however, that an alternative and 
independent ground for its conclusion that the harassment in that case 
was “because of” sex was the simple fact that the harassment of H. was 
explicitly sexual in nature. Id. at 576-580.  It is this suggestion that the 
Supreme Court explicitly rejects in Oncale.  See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 
(“We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment 
between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex 
merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations”). 
73  The court noted that the parties had focused most of their attention on 
the harassment suffered by H. Doe rather than that suffered by his 
brother J. Doe, and that it was the harassment suffered by H. “that most 
vividly illustrates why same-sex harassment is actionable as sex 
discrimination.”  Belleville, 119 F.3d at 569.  However, because both the 
parties and the district court addressed the Does’ claims collectively and 
the city “made no meaningful effort to distinguish J. Doe’s claims from 
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harassment of H. focused primarily on the fact that he wore 
an earring and was perceived as overly feminine.74  In 
concluding that the plaintiffs had presented evidence 
sufficient to show that they had been harassed “because of” 
sex, the Seventh Circuit relied directly on the Supreme 
Court’s gender stereotyping/trait equality rationale from 
Price Waterhouse.  The court explained that  “a man who is 
harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his 
hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his 
masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea 
of how men are to appear and behave is harassed ‘because 
of’ his sex.”75 
                                                                                                             
his brother’s,” the court concluded that both brothers were entitled to a 
trial on their sex discrimination claims.  Id. at 569.  
74  Most of the abuse H. suffered was at the hands of one co-worker Jeff 
Dawe, a former Marine.  Dawe “constantly referred to H. as ‘queer’ and 
‘fag’ and urged H. to “go back to San Francisco with the rest of the 
queers.’  Dawe also repeatedly inquired of H., ‘Are you a boy or a girl?’ 
Dawe soon took to calling H. his ‘bitch’ and said that he was going to 
take him ‘out to the woods’ and ‘get [him] up the ass.’”  Belleville, 119 
F.3d at 567.  On one occasion Dawe walked toward H. saying “’I’m going 
to finally find out if you are a girl or a guy.’”  Id. at 567.  Dawe then 
grabbed H. by the testicles and announced, “’Well, I guess he’s a guy.’”  
Id. at 567. 
75  Belleville, 119 F.3d at 581. Several other circuits have also noted in dicta 
that Title VII requires trait equality.  See e.g., Bibby,  260 F.3d at 262 
(noting that “a plaintiff may be able to prove that same-sex harassment 
was discrimination because of sex by presenting evidence that the 
harasser’s conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did not 
conform to the stereotypes of his or her gender”); Simonton v. Runyon, 
232 F.3d 33, 28 (stating that “[t]he Court in Price Waterhouse implied that 
a suit alleging harassment or disparate treatment based upon non 
conformity with sexual stereotypes is cognizable under Title VII as 
discrimination because of sex”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 
194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that “just as a woman can ground 
an action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did 
not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a 
claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him because he 
did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity.”).  See also Martin 
v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 224 F. Supp.2d 434, 447  
(N.D. N.Y. 2002) (recognizing sex stereotyping as a form of sex 
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 A Massachusetts district court applied the same 
analysis in Centola vs. Potter. 76  Stephen Centola worked as a 
letter carrier for the Postal Service for over seven years.  
During his employment he was subjected to “constant” 
sexually derogatory comments and jokes, most of which 
seemed related to his perceived effeminacy and 
homosexuality.77  In denying the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment, the court held that the plaintiff had 
presented sufficient evidence of sex discrimination by 
showing that his co-workers “punished him because they 
perceived him to be impermissibly feminine for a man.”78     
Despite courts’ use of the trait equality approach as a 
means of providing Title VII protection to effeminate men, 
courts have, by and large, not used the trait equality 
approach to prohibit discrimination against employees who 
engage in same-sex sexual relations or that against men who 
                                                                                                             
discrimination but finding that the plaintiff did not present any evidence 
showing that he was or was perceived by his co-workers to be 
effeminate); Ianetta v. Putnam Investments, Inc., 142 F. Supp.2d 131 (D. 
Mass. 2001) (finding that plaintiff had stated a cause of action under Title 
VII where he alleged that he was discriminated against because he did 
not conform to the male gender stereotype). 
76  183 F. Supp.2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002). 
77  Although Centola was gay, according to the court, “he never disclosed 
his sexual orientation to any of his co-workers or managers.”  Centola, 
183 F.Supp.2d at 407.  The court described the harassment endured by 
Centola as follows: “On one occasion, Centola’s co-workers placed a sign 
stating ‘Heterosexual replacement on Duty’ at his case [work space].  Co-
workers taped pictures of Richard Simmons ‘in pink hot pants’ to 
Centola’s case.  Fellow carriers asked Centola if he would be marching in 
a gay parade and asked him if he had gotten AIDS yet.  At other times, 
his co-workers called him a ‘sword swallower’ and anti-gay epithets.  
His co-workers also placed cartoons mocking gay men at his case.” Id. at 
407 (internal citations omitted).   
78  The court concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that 
“Centola’s co-workers harassed him because Centola did not conform 
with their ideas about what ‘real’ men should look or act like.  Just as 
Ann Hopkins was vilified for not being ‘feminine’ enough, Centola was 
vilified for not being more ‘manly.’”  Id. at 410. 
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wear women’s clothing.79  The Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Belleville is typical.  While endorsing the trait equality 
approach as a way to find discrimination based on male 
effeminacy actionable under Title VII, the court, 
nevertheless, concluded that Title VII did not prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.80   
                                                 
79  See e.g., Case, supra  note __; Taylor, supra note __; David S. Schwartz, 
When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment 
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1773-74 (2002) ("Embracing a sex-
stereotyping theory in a same-sex harassment case would be tantamount 
to extending Title VII harassment protection to lesbians, gays, and 
gender nonconformists.  Such discrimination is inevitably based on the 
perception that the target of the discrimination has failed to adopt 
behavior—gender or sexual behavior—deemed suitable to his or her sex, 
and is therefore discrimination 'because of . . . sex' under a plain 
language reading of Title VII"); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, 
and Tomboys:  Deconstructing the Conflation of ‘Sex,’ ‘Gender,’ and ‘Sexual 
Orientation’ in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 125-26 
(1995) ("[W]hile sex and gender discrimination are formally illegal and 
sexual orientation discrimination is not, it is impossible (by conflationary 
definition) to practice 'sexual orientation' discrimination without also 
and simultaneously committing sex and gender discrimination"); 
Catharine A. MacKinnon for National Organization on Male Sexual 
Victimization, et al., United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief in Oncale 
v. Sundowner Services, in support of Oncale,  1997 WL 471814 *28 ("When 
individuals are sexually harassed because of the sex of their sexual 
partners, real or imagined, they are harassed because of sex.  First, 
formally speaking, those harassed because they are gay men or lesbian 
women are harassed because of the gender of their sexual partners and 
identification.  If their own gender, or that of their loved ones, were 
different, they would not be so treated”); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 154-58 (1996) (using 
trait equality logic to argue that sexual orientation discrimination is a 
form of sex discrimination). 
80  See Belleville, 119 F.3d at 593 (endorsing the trait equality/gender 
stereotyping logic of Price Waterhouse but noting that “[t]he courts have 
widely agreed that discrimination based on sexual orientation (actual or 
perceived), as opposed to sex, is beyond the purview of Title VII”).  
Courts generally seem bolstered by Congress’s express refusal to extend 
Title VII protection to discrimination based on sexual orientation.  See e.g. 
Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541 at *4 n. 53 (listing the thirty one proposed bills 
introduced into the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives between 
1981-2001which have “attempted to amend Title VII and prohibit 
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Courts likewise have refused to use trait equality 
logic as a means of prohibiting discrimination against male 
cross-dressers.81  In Nichols, for example, the Ninth Circuit, 
                                                                                                             
employment discrimination on the basis of affectional or sexual 
orientation,” and emphasizing that none of them have passed).  See also 
Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35,38 (noting in dicta that Title VII does prohibit 
discrimination based on nonconformity with sexual stereotypes but 
emphasizing that “[t]he law is well-settled in this circuit and in all others 
to have reached the question that . . . Title VII does not prohibit 
harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation”); Spearman, 
231 F.3d at 1085-86 (recognizing that “sex stereotyping may constitute 
evidence of sex discrimination” but emphasizing that Title VII “does not 
prohibit harassment in general or of one’s homosexuality in particular”); 
Bibby, 260 F.3d at 264-65 (affirming grant of summary judgment to 
defendants because Title VII protects against discrimination based upon 
gender stereotypes but not against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation); Martin v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 224 F. 
Supp.2d 434, 446 (N.D. N.Y. 2002) (granting defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment on grounds that plaintiff was unable to show the 
harassment he suffered was because of his nonconformity with sex 
stereotypes rather than because of his sexual orientation which is not 
protected under Title VII). 
 There have, however, been rare exceptions to this unwillingness 
to use trait equality logic to prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.  See e.g., Centola v. Potter, 183 F.Supp.2d at 410 (suggesting 
that the trait equality logic used to find Title VII protection for men 
discriminated against because of their effeminacy should also provide 
protection for men discriminated against because they choose to date 
men instead of women); Heller, 195 F. Supp.2d at 1223 (concluding that 
harassment because of plaintiff’s lesbianism as well as harassment 
because of her perceived masculinity was actionable discrimination 
because of sex). 
81  See e.g., Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541 (granting defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on grounds that male employee who was 
terminated for dressing and acting like a woman during off work hours 
was not discriminated against because of sex); Dobre v. National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation, 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that 
plaintiff,  a male to female transsexual, who claimed she was 
discriminated against by, among other things, being forced to dress as a 
man, could not state a claim for sex discrimination); Tavora v. New York 
Mercantile Exchange, 101 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that it did not 
violate Title VII for an employer to require male employees to have short 
hair but imposing no similar restriction on female employees); Lockart v. 
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while holding that harassment of an effeminate man 
constituted sex discrimination, emphasized the limits of its 
holding: "We do not imply that all gender-based distinctions 
are actionable under Title VII.  For example, our decision 
does not imply that there is any violation of Title VII 
occasioned by reasonable regulations that require male and 
female employees to conform to different dress and 
grooming standards."82  The Supreme Court too suggested in 
Oncale that its trait equality logic does not extend this far.83 
                                                                                                             
Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 604 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that it 
did not constitute sex discrimination under Oregon law for an employer 
to fire a man for wearing an earring when female employees were 
permitted to do the same thing);  Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 
F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that company policy prohibiting long 
hair for male employees but not for female employees did not violate 
Title VII).  But see Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (D.C. 
Cal. 1972) (dress and grooming code constitutes sexual discrimination 
when applied differently to males and females); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of 
America, 337 F. Supp. 1357 (D.C. Cal. 1972) (rule requiring short hair on 
men but not on women violated Title VII); Roberts v. General Mills, Inc., 
337 F. Supp. 1055 (D.C. Ohio 1971) (rule allowing female employees to 
wear hairnets but requiring male employees to wear hats—and therefore 
keep their hair short—constituted sex discrimination).  
82  Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75 (finding that the plaintiff was harassed for 
not acting "as a man should act" and for having "feminine mannerisms" 
and concluding that such harassment was "because of sex."). 
83  The Supreme Court in Oncale noted that "[t]he prohibition of 
harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny 
in the workplace."  523 U.S. at 81.  Courts, however, may be somewhat 
more willing to apply the trait equality logic to clothing and grooming 
cases outside of the employment context.  In Rosa v. Park West Bank & 
Trust Co., for example, a bank employee refused to give Lucas Rosa a 
loan application because he was wearing a dress.  She told him she 
would not provide him with a loan application until he changed into 
more gender appropriate clothes.  214 F.3d 213, 214 (1st Cir. 2000).  Rosa 
sued under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act alleging sex 
discrimination. The Court of Appeals in reversing the district court's 
dismissal of Rosa's claim held that he had stated a cause of action for sex 
discrimination based on failure to satisfy gender stereotypes.  In 
recognizing Rosa' claim the court explained: "It is reasonable to infer that 
[the bank employee] told [Rosa] to go home and change because she 
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C.  Problems with the Trait Equality Approach 
 Despite its rhetorical appeal, the trait equality 
approach suffers from two weaknesses as a response to the 
question of when sex-specific trait discrimination should be 
actionable sex discrimination.  As will become clear shortly, 
the problems in fact map onto two distinct conceptions of 
the trait equality approach.  First, because true or pure cross-
sex trait equality can never exist, a finding of discrimination 
under this approach in fact relies on contested and 
controversial naming and framing choices.  In a gendered 
society, women and men simply cannot possess the same 
trait in precisely the same way.  This fact of substantive trait 
inequality undermines the most basic conception of and 
justification for the trait equality approach--that like must be 
treated alike.  It also, however, undermines the seemingly 
simple rule-like nature of the approach.  Because of the lack 
of real cross-sex trait parallels, determining when trait 
equality is met or violated becomes in effect an 
indeterminate nominalism game whose outcome depends 
on how one names the trait at issue and frames the cross sex 
comparison. The trait equality approach itself offers no 
guidance on these questions.   Second, the trait equality 
approach mistakenly equates nondiscrimination with formal 
neutrality and the nonenforcement of all gender norms.  The 
trait equality approach becomes more coherent and useful to 
the extent one understands it as grounded not on the idea 
that like must be treated alike but instead on the assertion 
that differences created by gender norms are illegitimate.  
Yet, trait equality’s requirement of rigid gender-blind 
neutrality is neither necessary for substantive sex equality 
nor otherwise normatively desirable.   
 
1.  The Problem of Indeterminance 
                                                                                                             
thought that [his] attire did not accord with his male gender . . ."  Id. at 
215-16.  
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To the extent that the trait equality approach is based 
on the idea that like must be treated alike, the approach is 
undermined by the fact that women and men never possess 
exactly the same traits in exactly the same way.  Given this 
fact, findings of discrimination become, in effect, the product 
of indeterminate nominalism choices: how does one name 
the trait at issue and frame the appropriate (approximate) 
cross sex comparison.  In this section I will move from 
examples in which the problem with cross sex trait 
parallelism is clear to those in which the problem is more 
subtle in order to highlight the impossibility in all cases of 
true trait equality.  In addition, I will show, with each set of 
examples, how contested nominalism questions determine 
findings of discrimination under this approach.       
 
a. Biological Traits 
 The impossibility of women and men possessing the 
same trait is most apparent in cases in which the trait at 
issue is a biological one which simply cannot be possessed 
by individuals of the opposite sex.  In such cases, true trait 
equality and theoretically pure cross sex comparisons are 
clearly not possible.  Findings of discrimination, therefore, 
necessarily depend upon how one frames the (approximate) 
cross sex comparison.     
Consider first the hypothetical case of an employer 
who happily hires both women and men but refuses to hire 
women with high-pitched voices.  The employer has no 
problem hiring or promoting women; the employer simply 
finds female high-pitched voices grating and so refuses to 
hire women with such voices. 
In order to determine whether the adverse treatment 
a woman with a high-pitched voice suffers is sex 
discrimination, the trait equality approach requires 
comparing her treatment to that of a man with the same 
trait.  Men, though, will not possess the very same trait.  
Some men may possess high-pitched male voices but none 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 
 
TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX  DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
 
 34
will possess a high-pitched female voice.84  It is not possible, 
therefore, to assert the high-voiced woman’s sex 
discrimination claim by pointing to the employer’s different 
treatment of men with the very same attribute.  
Applying the trait equality approach in practice 
necessarily requires loosening the comparison.  One might, 
for example, name the trait for which the woman was fired 
as a voice that was unexpectedly or unusually high-pitched 
and then compare her treatment to that of men who also had 
unexpectedly or unusually high pitched voices.  One could, 
in other words, try to show that the employer treated 
women with high-pitched voices worse than it treated men 
with high-pitched voices and violated the (pragmatic) 
mandate of trait equality in this way.     
It is not at all clear, however, that naming the trait at 
issue and framing the cross sex comparison in this way 
makes sense.  Unusually high-pitched female voices really 
are different from unusually high-pitched male voices both 
in tone and effect, and it may be that only the former give 
the employer a headache.85  De-sexing and re-naming the 
                                                 
84  Women’s and men’s voices differ not only in pitch but in a number of 
other aspects stemming from anatomical differences between them.  See 
Ronald C. Scherer, A Basic Overview of Voice Production, at 
www.voicefoundation.org/VFScherervoiceprod.html (explaining that 
“[t]he voices of women and men differ relative to a number of aspects 
including larynx size, speaking pitch, pitch range, the space between the 
vocal folds, and the incidence of voice problems).  Indeed, producing 
plausible female voices remains a significant problem for male-to-female 
transsexuals.  See Kerstin Neumann, et al., Cricothyroidopopexy in Male-to 
female-Transsexuals, 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TRANSGENDERISM 
(2002), available online at www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtvo06no03_oh.htm, 
(explaining that “[t]he secondary sex characteristic of the larynx with its 
vocal function remains a major obstacle to male-to-female transsexuals 
‘passing’ as female”); Susan D. Clark, To Sound Like a Woman, GENDYS 
Conference 1998, available online at 
www.gender.org.uk/conf/1998/clark.htm (providing therapeutic 
techniques to assist male-to-female transsexuals in developing female 
voices).  
85  To the extent that the employer’s prohibition on high voices can be 
characterized as a neutral requirement that workers have voices that are 
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trait at issue for the woman with the high-pitched voice may 
enable a cross sex comparison, but it may also 
fundamentally distort the trait for which the woman is 
actually being disadvantaged.   
Problems stemming from the lack of true cross sex 
trait equality have been most obvious and acute in courts’ 
analysis of sex discrimination claims based on pregnancy.  
Pregnancy, like the high-pitched female voice, has no 
identical cross sex parallel--men cannot become pregnant.  
Under a rigid (yet theoretically pure) application of trait 
equality logic, therefore, pregnancy discrimination would 
never constitute sex discrimination.  Because a pregnant 
woman could never show that she was being treated worse 
than a man with the (precise) same trait, she could never 
show that adverse employment actions related to her 
pregnancy discriminated against her on the basis of sex.86   
This was the approach the Supreme Court followed, 
and the conclusion that it reached, in Geduldig v. Aiello87 and 
General Electric v. Gilbert.88  Geduldig involved a 14th 
Amendment challenge to a California state disability 
insurance program which denied benefits for pregnancy 
related needs.  The court held that the program did not 
                                                                                                             
below a certain pitch or decibel level, a female plaintiff who is denied 
employment as a result might be able to challenge the prohibition as 
having a disparate impact on female job applicants.  If, however, the 
prohibition actually affected only a very small percentage of female job 
applicants, the plaintiff might not be able to show a significant group-
based disparity of impact to be actionable.  
86  There has been extensive scholarly writing on the proper way to frame 
pregnancy for the purposes of antidiscrimination law.  See e.g., Herma 
Hill Kay, Equality and Difference:  The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1985); Reva B. Siegel, Employment Equality Under the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929 (1985); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating 
the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1995); Wendy W. 
Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special 
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1984-85). 
87  417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
88  429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
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violate the Equal Protection Clause because the program did 
not penalize women for possessing a trait which men were 
not penalized for possessing.  In effect, according to the 
court, the program did not discriminate on the basis of sex 
because it did not distinguish between pregnant women and 
pregnant men.  Instead, the program simply distinguished 
between “pregnant women and non pregnant persons”89   
Two years later, in Gilbert, the Court applied trait 
equality logic in the same way.  Gilbert involved a Title VII 
challenge to an employer’s disability plan which, while 
otherwise comprehensive, excluded coverage for disabilities 
arising from pregnancy.90  Following Geduldig, the Court 
held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from 
coverage did not constitute sex discrimination in violation of 
Title VII because the employer was not treating female 
employees worse than similarly situated male employees.91  
Rather than denying women something that was granted to 
men, the plan denied pregnancy related benefits to all 
employees regardless of their sex.92  As the Court explained: 
“pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk, 
unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for 
this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the 
benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results 
from the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks.”93 
Congress responded to Gilbert and Geduldig by 
passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in which it told 
courts that the appropriate comparison in pregnancy 
discrimination cases was the treatment of pregnant women 
and that of non pregnant persons similar in terms of their 
“ability or inability to work.”94  In a sense the court renamed 
                                                 
89  417 U.S. at 496-97. 
90  429 U.S. at 127-31. 
91  Id. at 133-36. 
92  Id. at 138-39. 
93  Id. at 139. 
94  The Pregnancy Disability Act was added to Title VII in 1978 and 
amended its definitions portion.  It provides in relevant part: 
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the trait at issue from pregnancy per se to the more 
generalized trait of physical disability and then reframed the 
cross sex comparison in terms of this non sex specific trait.  
Framing questions in the pregnancy context remain, 
however.  Circuit courts are divided as to whether the 
precise comparison should be to employees similarly 
situated in their ability or inability to work regardless of the 
source of their injuries or to only those similarly abled 
employees suffering from nonoccupational injuries.95   
                                                                                                             
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis 
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; 
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all 
employment-related purposes, including receipt of 
benefits under fringe benefit programs as other persons 
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to 
work. 
42 U.S.C. §2000e(k).  See also Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 (“The [PDA] 
makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy–related 
conditions less favorably than other medical conditions”). 
95  Compare Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that in order to determine whether there is a PDA violation the 
treatment of pregnant women should be compared with the treatment of 
nonpregnant individuals who are similar in terms of their ability or 
inability to work regardless of the place of their injury); with Urbano v. 
Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
treatment of pregnant women must be compared with that of similarly 
abled nonpregnant workers who were injured off the job); Spivey v. 
Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
PDA required that pregnant women be treated the same as other 
similarly abled workers who suffered nonoccupational disabilities).  See 
generally Jamie L. Clanton, Toward Eradicating Pregnancy Discrimination at 
Work: Interpreting the PDA to “Mean What it Says,” 86 IOWA L. REV. 703 
(2001) (analyzing the disagreement among courts over who is similarly 
situated to the pregnant woman  under the PDA). 
 In the race context, challenges to employers’ no facial hair 
policies raise similar framing issues.  Black men sometimes challenge 
such policies because shaving leads to the skin condition 
pseudofolliculitis barbae in a significant number of black men while 
having no such effect on white men.  See Christine Jolls, 
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 654 (2001).   
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b. Dress, Appearance & Sexual Orientation  
The impossibility of true cross sex trait equality is not 
limited to a narrow range of cases involving sex-specific 
biological traits, nor are the accompanying nominalism 
issues so limited.  Such problems with the trait equality 
approach are also clear in cases involving trait 
discrimination based on dress, appearance and sexual 
orientation.   
Consider first a hypothetical employer who is 
generally perfectly willing to hire women but refuses to hire 
women who wear sexy clothes to work.  There is no exact 
male equivalent to the female trait of sexy dressing and 
attempts to choose an appropriate cross sex approximation 
are puzzling.  
One could, for example, name the trait at issue in the 
sexy dressing case in a narrowly literalistic way as wearing 
                                                                                                             
Plaintiffs and courts have generally treated such policies as race neutral 
ones.  They have framed the trait at issue as having facial hair and 
concluded that the policies treat black men and white men the same with 
respect to this trait.  Whether the policies resulted in an illegal disparate 
impact on black men rather than whether they were an illegal form of 
disparate treatment discrimination has generally been the issue in these 
cases.  See e.g., EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(upholding no-beard policy against disparate impact challenge because 
plaintiff in that case could not show actual disparate impact against 
black men resulting from policy); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, 7 F.3d 795 
(8th Cir. 1993) (striking down no-beard policy in response to a disparate 
impact challenge because employer could not show the policy was 
justified by business necessity); Richardson v. Quik Trip Corp., 591 F. Supp. 
1151 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (striking down no-beard policy because of its 
disparate impact on black men); EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54 
(D. Colo. 1981) (same); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 
1993) (ruling for employer on disparate impact challenge to no-beard 
policy on grounds that policy was justified by business necessity). One 
could, however, frame the trait at issue in these cases not as the presence 
of facial hair but as the proclivity for skin disease.  Because a no facial 
hair policy requires black men, but not white men, to take steps to cause 
themselves skin disease, the policy looks like a form of race-specific trait 
discrimination when framed in this way.   
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particular types of clothes, i.e. low cut blouses and tight 
skirts.  Naming the trait at issue in this way, the woman is 
the victim of sex discrimination if she is being treated worse 
than a man who wore the same types of blouses and skirts to 
work.  She is not the victim of sex discrimination if she is not 
being treated worse than a man who wore the same clothes.  
Framing the issue in this way is unlikely to result in a 
finding of sex discrimination.  
It is far from clear, however, that this narrowly 
literalistic framing of the cross sex comparison is 
appropriate.  The proper comparator for the sexy dressed 
woman may not be a man dressed in the very same clothing.  
A man dressed in a low cut blouse and tight skirt might be 
objectionable to the employer but it is probably not because 
he is sexy.  If the employer is really objecting to a female 
employee exuding sexuality at work, it arguably does not 
bolster or refute this woman’s claim of sex discrimination 
under the trait equality approach to show that the employer 
also objects to hiring men in drag.  Sexy dressed women and 
men in drag arguably do not possess the same (or even a 
close approximation of the same) trait.96 
                                                 
96  Consider similarly a woman and man who both wear high healed 
shoes to work.  What it means, to wear high heels as a woman is very 
different from what it means to wear high heels as a man.  Wearing high 
heels as a woman fits into a particular pattern of decoration-focused 
traits and attributes commonly and acceptably associated with women.  
High-heel wearing has meaning for women—it is associated with 
sexiness, dressiness, and physical display—and it is a meaning stemming 
from the trait’s comfortable place within a set of gender appropriate 
behavior.  What it means to wear high heels as a man is entirely 
different.  High-heel wearing is not part of a set of gender appropriate 
behavior for men.  As a result, high-heel wearing for men is commonly 
perceived as neither sexy nor dressy but simply deviant and strange.  In 
Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., the district court saw a man dressing 
as a woman as not only dissimilar from a woman dressing as a woman 
but indeed as disordered. According to the court, “this is not a situation 
where the plaintiff failed to conform to a gender stereotype.  Plaintiff 
was not discharged because he did not act sufficiently masculine or 
because he exhibited traits normally valued in a female employee, but 
disparaged in a male employee.  . . .   The plaintiff was terminated 
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Alternatively then, one could instead frame the cross 
sex comparison by looking at the way the employer treats 
men dressed in sex-specific sexy clothing.  Of course, 
deciding what constitutes sexy dressing for men is itself not 
obvious and probably open to disagreement.97  Is the parallel 
to the sexy dressing woman in revealing short skirts and low 
cut blouses a man in revealing open-chested shirts and tight 
pants.  Or, because of the significantly different social and 
symbolic meanings of women and men in revealing 
clothing, are tight and revealing clothes considered sexy in 
women but strange, inappropriate and nonsexy in men such 
that this too may not be an appropriate comparison?   
Finally, one could instead compare the employer’s 
treatment of sexy dressing women with its treatment of men 
who violate appropriate workplace norms.  At this level of 
abstraction, however, the trait equality approach becomes 
toothless and unable to challenge employers’ endorsement 
of any gender stereotypes.   The problem is not only that 
there is no exact cross sex trait parallel but that there is no 
good, and certainly no uncontroversial, approximation. 
Naming and framing issues of this sort dominated the 
court’s analysis in the sex discrimination case of Craft v. 
Metromedia.98  Christine Craft was hired as a TV co-anchor 
by a television station in Kansas City, Missouri.  
Immediately after she began the job, the station began 
having concerns about Craft’s appearance.  Public opinion 
surveys performed by a media consultant company hired by 
the television station found that viewers had an 
“overwhelmingly negative” response to Craft’s 
                                                                                                             
because he is a man with gender identity disorder who, in order to 
publicly disguise himself as a woman, wears women’s clothing, shoes, 
underwear, breast prostheses, wigs, make-up, and nail polish, pretends 
to be a woman, and publicly identifies himself as a woman named 
‘Donna.’”  See Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541 at *5.   
97  I suspect there is significantly less social consensus regarding what 
constitutes sexy dressing for men than there is about what constitutes 
sexy dressing for women. 
98  766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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appearance.99  After continually poor survey results, the 
station reassigned Craft from co-anchor to reporter.  Craft 
refused to accept the assignment and sued for sex 
discrimination.100  Craft argued that she was discriminated 
against because she was held to more stringent appearance 
standards than were male newscasters.  The district court 
ruled in favor of Metromedia on Craft’s Title VII sex 
discrimination claim and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.  
 As with the previous examples, it is not clear how to 
analyze Craft’s discrimination claim under the trait equality 
approach.  It is not clear how to characterize the trait for 
which Craft was fired nor how to identify appropriate male 
employees with whom to compare her treatment.  Was Craft 
demoted for possessing particular/precise traits (e.g., having 
short hair, wearing oxford shirts) such that her treatment 
should be compared to that of male newscasters possessing 
the same traits?  Interpreting the trait for which Craft was 
demoted in this narrow way does not, however, well capture 
what the station actually found problematic about Craft’s 
appearance.  The station was clearly concerned with Craft 
having an overall appearance that was pleasing and 
attractive to viewers.  It was not committed to or concerned 
about Craft having any particular aesthetic attributes.  
Indeed, judging from the many different people hired by the 
station to advise Craft about her wardrobe and appearance, 
it appears that the station did not have a clear idea about 
what physical and clothing attributes would please 
mercurial viewer tastes.  Alternatively, was Craft demoted 
for having an overall appearance that was unattractive to 
viewers such that her treatment should be compared to that 
of male newscasters whose appearance was also unattractive 
to viewers?  This was essentially the comparison that both 
the district and the circuit courts made.101  Again though, 
                                                 
99  Id. at 1209. 
100  Id. at 1209. 
101 The district court concluded: "defendant's standards of appearance for 
its on-air personnel can in no way be considered discriminatory per se.  
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applying the trait equality rationale at this high level of 
abstraction simply reifies socially gendered conceptions of 
beauty and fails to find discrimination any time an employer 
consistently enforces sex specific gender norms.   
In fact, Craft did not object to her being held to a 
different gender specific standard of grooming and 
appearance.  She simply argued that these standards were 
more stringent and more strictly enforced for women than 
for men.102  However, once one accepts the legitimacy or 
                                                                                                             
Both men and women were required to maintain a professional, 
business-like appearance consistent with community standards."  Craft v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 877 (W.D. Mo. 1983).  The court of 
appeals agreed that the station's enforcement of socially gendered 
appearance standards on its newscasters was consistent and non 
discriminatory.  According to the court: 
While there may have been some emphasis on the 
feminine stereotype of 'softness' and bows and ruffles 
and on the fashionableness of female anchors, the 
evidence suggests such concerns were incidental to a 
true focus on consistency of appearance, proper 
coordination of colors and textures, the effects of studio 
lighting on clothing and makeup, and the greater degree 
of conservatism thought necessary in the Kansas City 
market.  The 'dos' and 'don'ts' for female anchors 
addressed the need to avoid, for example, tight sweaters 
or overly 'sexy' clothing and extreme 'high fashion' or 
'sporty' outfits while the male 'dos' and 'don'ts' similarly 
cautioned against 'frivolous' colors and 'extreme' 
textures and styles as damaging to the 'authority' of 
newscasters.  These criteria do not implicate the primary 
thrust of Title VII, which is to prompt employers to 
'discard outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct 
employment disadvantage for one sex.'   
Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215 (citations omitted).  
102  Craft and supporting amici curiae argued both that the television 
station enforced appearance standards more strictly on female than male 
on-air personnel and that the socially gendered appearance standards 
themselves were discriminatory.  Craft, 766 F.2d at 1212-1214.  Craft 
presented evidence showing that "only females were subject to daily 
scrutiny of their appearance or were ever required to change clothes at 
the station before going on the air and that no male was ever directed to 
take time from his journalistic duties to select clothing, with the help of a 
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necessity of sex-specific appearance scales, there is no way to 
identify a good opposite-sex parallel to Craft's level of 
attractiveness so as to determine whether men with similar 
levels of attractiveness were treated differently. 
Related nominalism issues arise in cases involving 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  When a woman 
is discriminated against for engaging in a sexual relationship 
with a woman it is significant, and often outcome 
determinative under trait equality logic, how one names the 
trait for which she is being adversely treated.  There is no 
trait that a man can possess that is exactly the same as the 
one the woman is being fired for. Having sex with a woman 
as a man is different from having sex with a woman as a 
woman, and having sex with someone of the same sex as a 
man is different than having sex with someone of the same 
sex as a woman.  There is no exact opposite sex trait parallel 
for the woman having sex with a woman.   
Findings of discrimination under the trait equality 
approach again descend to the level of nominalism.  If one 
names the trait at issue as having sex with women, then the 
appropriate opposite sex parallel would be a man who has 
sex with women.  If the woman who has sex with women is 
treated adversely while the man who has sex with women is 
not, then the trait equality requirement has been violated 
and sex discrimination exists.  If, however, one names the 
trait at issue as engaging in same-sex or homosexual sexual 
relations, then the opposite sex parallel would be a man who 
also engages in same sex or homosexual sexual relations.  If 
the woman is not being treated worse than a man who also 
engages in same-sex sexual relations then the trait equality 
                                                                                                             
consultant, from Macy's and to test that clothing on camera for the 
approval of another consultant."  Id. at 1212-1213.  In addition, Craft, but 
seemingly no one else at the station, was eventually required to use a 
clothing calendar.  According to the court of appeals, "[t]he 'clothing 
calendar' was a calendar given to Craft showing in detail for each day 
the blazer, blouse, and skirt (or occasionally slacks) she was to wear.  A 
note in one corner indicated that the appropriate accessory would be 
either a single strand of pearls or a single gold chain."  Id. at 1209 n. 2. 
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requirement has not been violated and sex discrimination 
does not exist.  How one names the initial trait at issue is 
conceptually ambiguous, politically loaded, and outcome 
determinative under the trait equality approach to trait 
discrimination.103   
                                                 
103  Certainly there has been a great deal of scholarly writing regarding 
why one type of framing is better than the alternatives.  See e.g., Edward 
Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay 
Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001) (highlighting the weaknesses of the 
argument that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of sex 
discrimination); Andrew Koppelman, Defending The Sex Discrimination 
Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 519 (arguing in favor of treating discrimination based on sexual 
orientation as a form of sex discrimination).  See also David S. Schwartz, 
When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment 
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1773-74 (2002) ("Embracing a sex-
stereotyping theory in a same-sex harassment case would be tantamount 
to extending Title VII harassment protection to lesbians, gays, and 
gender nonconformists.  Such discrimination is inevitably based on the 
perception that the target of the discrimination has failed to adopt 
behavior—gender or sexual behavior—deemed suitable to his or her sex, 
and is therefore discrimination 'because of . . . sex' under a plain 
language reading of Title VII"); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, 
and Tomboys:  Deconstructing the Conflation of ‘Sex,’ ‘Gender,’ and ‘Sexual 
Orientation’ in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 125-26 
(1995) ("[W]hile sex and gender discrimination are formally illegal and 
sexual orientation discrimination is not, it is impossible (by conflationary 
definition) to practice 'sexual orientation' discrimination without also 
and simultaneously committing sex and gender discrimination"); 
Catharine A. MacKinnon for National Organization on Male Sexual 
Victimization, et al., United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief in Oncale 
v. Sundowner Services, in support of Oncale,  1997 WL 471814 *28 ("When 
individuals are sexually harassed because of the sex of their sexual 
partners, real or imagined, they are harassed because of sex.  First, 
formally speaking, those harassed because they are gay men or lesbian 
women are harassed because of the gender of their sexual partners and 
identification.  If their own gender, or that of their loved ones, were 
different, they would not be so treated'); Stephen Clark, Same-Sex But 
Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation Analogy, 34 RUTGERS L. J. 107, 120-
38 2002) (discussing and analyzing the different ways to conceptualize 
discrimination based on one’s involvement in a same-sex sexual 
relationship);ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
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c. Character Traits 
 The indeterminacy of the trait equality approach is 
not limited to exceptional cases.  In somewhat more subtle 
ways the impossibility of cross sex trait parallelism and the 
naming and framing problems that stem from it are 
systematic and undermine the approach’s usefulness  in all 
cases, not only the more obvious ones discussed above. 
In a sexist society nothing done by men and women 
will have precisely the same meaning.  Traits are not 
understood or viewed as isolated technical attributes.  They 
are necessarily viewed in relation to all the other traits an 
individual possesses and through a systematically gendered 
lens.   
Traits such as competitiveness or active leadership, 
for example, are perceived very differently when possessed 
by women or men.  Consider one study in which 
participants were told to evaluate job candidates for a 
computer lab manager position at a university.  Participants 
viewed videotapes and read “life philosophy” essays from 
female and male candidates.   Researchers found that female 
candidates with essays that emphasized “agentic” qualities 
such as competitiveness were rated “less socially skilled and 
likeable than an identically presented man.”104  Another 
study found that the same leadership activities of women 
and men resulted in very different affective responses from 
those dealing with them.  Women engaging in group 
leadership activities received more displeased responses and 
fewer pleased responses from group members than did men 
                                                                                                             
SOCIAL EQUALITY 154-58 (1996) (using trait equality logic to argue that 
sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination). 
104  Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and 
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743, 747 (2001).  The 
study involved as participants 172 (105 women, and 67 men) 
undergraduates at Rutgers University.  The participants viewed 
videotapes and read “life philosophy” essays from women and men 
whom they were told were candidates for a computer lab manager 
position at the university.  
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engaging in the same behavior and making the same 
suggestions and arguments.105 Therefore, even when 
technical trait symmetries are possible (in the sense that 
women and men can physically do precisely the same thing), 
traits will mean very different things when possessed by a 
woman or by a man.   
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins provides a good example.  
It is simply not the case that Hopkins was fired for engaging 
in or exhibiting the same traits that men engaged in and 
exhibited.  Social meanings are real.  Aggressiveness in 
women is bitchy in a way aggressiveness in men is not.  
Competitiveness in women is threatening in a way that 
competitiveness in men is not.  Vulgarity in women is 
shocking and disturbing in a way that vulgarity in men is 
not.  Even if Ann Hopkins had engaged in technically 
identical behavior to that of her male colleagues, her 
behavior would not have been socially the same.  
Determining whether Hopkins was the victim of sex 
                                                 
105 See D. Butler, & F.L. Geis, Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male and Female 
Leaders: Implications for Leadership Evaluations, 58 J. PERSONALITY AND 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 48 (1990).  The study involved 168 student 
participants (84 women and 84 men).  Participants took part in small 
discussion groups composed of one male and one female participant and 
one male and one female confederate who were trained by the 
researchers to perform the role of group leader in a standardized 
manner.  The study used two leader scripts, A and B, in all discussions. 
In half the sessions the male leader used script A and the female leader 
used script B, and in the other sessions it was reversed.  Coders sat in an 
adjacent room behind one way mirrors and tallied participants’ non 
verbal affect expressions.  Coders tallied nonverbal cues of pleasure such 
as smiling or nodding in agreement and coded nonverbal cues of 
displeasure such as a furrowed brow, tightening of the mouth or nods of 
disagreement.  In addition to controlling what the female and male 
leaders actually said, the researches monitored the male and female 
leaders to make sure that they did not differ in eye contact, gaze 
direction, body posture or amount of body movement.  See also Eagly, 
A.H., Makhjani, M.G. & Klonsky, B.G., Gender and the Evaluation of 
Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 111 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 3 (1992) (finding 
that women managers with a direct task-oriented leadership style are 
evaluated more negatively than men with similar management styles).   
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15
 
 
TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX  DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
 
 47
discrimination under the trait equality approach again 
depends on how one chooses to name the behavior for 
which she was fired and frame the (approximate) cross sex 
comparison. 
To point out that women and men can never possess 
precisely the same traits in precisely the same way is not to 
argue that employers are therefore justified in treating 
women and men differently.  Recognizing the gendered 
meanings of traits is important, though, because it highlights 
that to the extent that women and men should be treated the 
same it is not because they are in fact precisely the same but 
in spite of the fact that they are not.  It was appropriate, for 
example, for Title VII to prohibit law firms from refusing to 
hire female lawyers because clients objected to working with 
them.  But this was not because female lawyers really 
were/are just like male lawyers.  Instead, it was because 
eradicating the gender norms that made female lawyers 
seem strange, incompetent, or offensive was essential to Title 
VII’s sex equality mission.  
This recognition then also suggests a second possible 
conception of and justification for the trait equality approach 
to sex discrimination.  Perhaps the real intuition underlying 
and driving the trait equality approach is not that aggressive 
women or men in dresses must be treated the same as 
aggressive men or women in dresses because they are in fact 
the same, but that they cannot be treated differently because 
of gender norms.  In other words, the vision of 
nondiscrimination underlying the trait equality approach 
may not be based on a claim of sameness but instead on a 
claim of the illegitimacy of certain kinds of differences.  The 
trait equality approach viewed in this way requires willful 
blindness to social meanings about gender and defines 
nondiscrimination as the elimination, or at least the 
nonenforcement, of gender norms by employers. 
In the following section, I will show that this second 
conception of trait equality, while certainly more coherent at 
explaining why aggressive women should be treated like 
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aggressive men and men in dresses should be treated like 
women in dresses, is no better at justifying trait equality as 
the appropriate response to sex-specific trait discrimination 
under Title VII.  Title VII’s nondiscrimination mandate does 
not require the rigid neutrality and blindness to gender 
norms called for by the trait equality approach.  Moreover, 
the approach, while not necessary for substantive equality, is 
likely to be costly in terms of employee and employer 
liberty. 
     
2. The Problem of Neutrality 
 An alternative way to understand the trait equality 
approach is as an argument against gender norms.  
Nondiscrimination requires rigid neutrality toward women 
and men engaged in technically similar behavior not because 
the behavior really looks the same, but because the reason it 
looks different is illegitimate.  The approach conceived of in 
this way views gender norms as illegitimate and the 
nonenforcement of them as a core component of Title VII’s 
nondiscrimination goal.  Although the trait equality 
requirement of rigid sex neutrality becomes more coherent 
as a result of this anti-norms argument, it becomes no more 
convincing as an interpretation of Title VII.  In this section I 
argue that rigid neutrality is neither required by Title VII nor 
otherwise normatively appealing.  I show that sex neutral 
rules themselves do not always look nondiscriminatory, and, 
more importantly, nonneutral rules are not always 
discriminatory.  Rigid neutrality and elimination of gender, 
is not necessary to end sex hierarchy in the workplace and is 
not, therefore, required by Title VII.  Moreover, equating 
nondiscrimination with rigid neutrality is likely to 
encourage an androgyny in the workplace that, while being 
unnecessary for equality, has serious costs for individual 
liberty.  
What nondiscrimination means in the context of 
employment may actually be significantly more complex 
than the formal sex neutrality called for by the trait equality 
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approach. To highlight the intuitive disconnect between 
neutrality and nondiscrimination consider three scenarios 
and how they play out under the trait equality approach.   
a.  The Aggressive Woman.  As the Hopkins case illustrated, 
aggressive women are viewed differently and more 
negatively than are aggressive men.  Aggressive men are 
likely to be perceived as authoritative and competent while 
aggressive women are likely to be perceived as bitchy, shrill, 
and overbearing.  A woman who is terminated or denied 
promotion for engaging in the same aggressive behavior that 
male co-workers engage in without adverse effect might 
argue that trait equality requires that she be treated the same 
as similarly behaving men despite the different social 
meanings attached to the behavior for women and men.   
b. The Cross-dressing Man.  Men in traditionally female 
clothing and make-up are viewed more negatively than are 
women in the same attire.  Women wearing traditionally 
female clothes are viewed as social conformists, while men 
wearing women’s clothes are viewed as gender 
nonconformists and, sometimes, as social deviants.  A man 
denied employment or terminated from employment 
because of his cross-dressing might rely on the trait equality 
approach to argue that he cannot be penalized for engaging 
in the same behavior—e.g. wearing skirts, high heels, and 
make-up—which female employees engage in without 
adverse action.   
c. The Buzz Cut Woman.  A buzz haircut on a woman has 
significantly different meaning than a buzz haircut on a 
man.  Shannon Faulkner made this point when she fought to 
gain admittance to The Citadel without also being forced to 
get the “knob” haircut traditional to male cadets.  As 
Faulkner argued, while the meaning of the buzz cut on a 
man is an acceptable masculinity, the meaning of the buzz 
cut on a woman is an unacceptable and strange masculinity 
at odds with appropriate gender norms.  On a woman, a 
buzz cut would signal not straight-laced hyper-masculinity 
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but socially and sexually deviant “outlaw” status.106  The 
Citadel responded by invoking the logic of trait equality.  
The Citadel argued that if nondiscrimination means treating 
women and men the same regardless of the different social 
meanings attached to particular traits, then they could not be 
engaging in sex discrimination by treating Faulkner the way 
they would treat any incoming male cadet who refused to 
get the knob haircut.107   
 
 From the perspective of the trait equality approach, it 
is hard to distinguish among these cases.  The trait equality 
approach, at least when applied in the way its advocates 
encourage, seems to protect the aggressive woman, the 
cross-dressing man and The Citadel.  One might believe, 
however, that as a substantive matter rejecting gender norms 
and acting neutrally in the context of The Citadel hindered 
rather than encouraged sex equality. 108 
This was the argument made by Faulkner and The 
Department of Justice.   Faulkner’s lawyer argued that “[t]he 
principle of formal equality . . . ignored the social meaning 
of the haircut, a code for masculinity that marks a cadet as 
male. . . .  Stripped of her hair, Shannon would be doubly 
excluded: she would not look like a male cadet, but neither 
would she look like a real woman.  She would be a gender 
outlaw—neither male nor female.  Doubtless many male 
                                                 
106  See Valerie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in 
Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68, 70-71 (2002).  
See also Center for Military Readiness, et al. United States Supreme Court 
Brief in U.S. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, in support of Commonwealth of 
Virginia.  1995 WL 744997 at *14 (describing the Department of Justice 
arguments to the district court that a buzz haircut simply did not fit into 
the range of traits and attributes deemed socially acceptable for women). 
107  See Vojdik, supra note __ at 70-71 (noting The Citadel argument that 
equal treatment “meant the same treatment afforded male cadets”). 
108  Imposing trait equality on Faulkner in this case would probably seem 
discriminatory even if the requirement were not so clearly being used by 
the Citadel as simply a pretext for her exclusion.   See Vojdik, supra note 
__ (describing the violence and desperation with which The Citadel tried 
to exclude Faulkner). 
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cadets would label her a ‘dyke,’ a butch lesbian whose 
sexual desire for women makes her not a ‘real woman.’”109  
Similarly, the Department of Justice argued that The Citadel 
“’was proceeding under the guise of gender-neutral 
grooming policies [that] implement rules which altogether 
denigrate Ms. Faulkner’s identity as a woman.’”110  The 
district court rejected these norm-based arguments and 
adopted instead the equation of nondiscrimination with 
formal trait equality when it refused to enjoin The Citadel 
from requiring Faulkner to get the knob haircut.111  As the 
district court essentially asked, if neutrality is the 
appropriate definition of nondiscrimination then how can it 
be discrimination to impose a sex-neutral trait  requirement?  
One might of course argue that it is one thing to 
require sex neutrality when it is being sought by a plaintiff 
who wants to possess a gender atypical trait, but it is 
something quite distinct to allow employers to impose a sex- 
neutral (but gender bending) requirement on an unwilling 
plaintiff who does not want to challenge traditional gender 
norms.  It is a different thing, in other words, to say The 
Citadel must permit Faulkner to get a knob haircut if she 
had wanted one, than to say that The Citadel may require 
Faulkner to get a knob haircut even if she does not want 
one.112  This distinction is certainly meaningful.  It suggests, 
                                                 
109  Vojdik, supra note __ at 71. 
110  Center for Military Readiness Amicus Brief, supra note __ at *14 
(source of quotation omitted from original).  One could likewise imagine 
an employer that refused to hire anyone with hair longer than one-
quarter inch in length.  The employer would argue that its policy did not 
violate the trait equality requirement while women challenging the 
policy would argue that nondiscrimination required something other 
than trait equality. 
111  Vojdik, supra note __ at 71. 
112  Imagine that Faulkner had wanted to get a knob haircut and The 
Citadel had tried to stop her by arguing that on women the haircut 
signified a strange outlaw status that was not in keeping with the 
mission and message of The Citadel.  In this scenario, arguments about 
the social meaning of hair probably seem less persuasive and 
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however, that what it means to not discriminate on the basis 
of sex may in fact be significantly more complicated than a 
simple requirement of employer neutrality.  
Trait equality advocates might respond by arguing 
that although for them nondiscrimination always requires 
sex-neutral requirements, not every neutrally imposed 
requirement will be acceptable, some will be impermissibly 
burdensome or unfairly costly for individuals of one sex or 
the other.113  Neutrality, they might argue, is in a sense a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for nondiscrimination. 
Even this claim is too strong, however.  Neutrality 
and the nonenforcement of gender norms are not always 
necessary for nondiscrimination, and nonneutrality does not 
always constitute sex discrimination.  Certainly, many 
gender norms—such as that equating female aggressiveness 
with bitchiness—are incompatible with women’s full, 
effective participation in the work world.  All gender norms, 
however, are not created equal.  Employers may recognize 
some norms without impeding sex equality in the 
workplace.  An employer may, for example, require male 
employees to have hair no longer than the top of their collars 
while imposing no such requirement on female employees.  
The gender norm at issue—that serious, professional men 
have short hair--does not reinforce messages of male 
dominance or of female weakness, sexual availability or 
incompetence.  Enforcing the norm that men should have 
short hair does not limit the range of job possibilities 
available to men or diminish their perceived competence for 
such jobs.  Permitting women a wider range of acceptable 
hairstyles enables them to mimic a professional male 
hairstyle or choose a more traditionally feminine style.  
Similarly an employer may permit women to wear skirts 
without permitting men to do so.  Again, men are not 
                                                                                                             
arguments in favor of trait equality more persuasive than they did in 
the actual case.     
113  Such is, of course, the insight of the disparate impact doctrine of Title 
VII. 
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disadvantaged in the work world by being forced to mimic 
the clothing style of the ideal male worker, and women, too, 
are not harmed by being given the choice of mimicking the 
ideal male clothing style or choosing a more traditionally 
feminine style.  Allowing employers to act on the gender 
norm making men in dresses seem deviant does not impede 
the ability of men (or women) to participate fully and 
effectively in the work world.  Certainly, some men will feel 
constrained by the previous sex-specific trait requirements, 
but the requirements themselves do not inhibit the 
substantive sex equality that is Title VII’s goal.  Moreover, as 
a practical matter, it is unlikely that gender-bending men 
will be less constrained under a pure trait equality regime 
than under one allowing for limited instances of sex-specific 
workplace rules.  
One possible result of the trait equality approach, the 
one advocates like Case and Taylor hope for, is that 
employers will expand the range of permissible traits and 
attributes open to employees of both sexes  allowing both 
women and men to gender bend or not gender bend 
depending on their own preferences.  An employer might, 
for example, have a grooming code that allowed for two 
possible haircuts.  One shoulder-length bob generally more 
appealing to women, and one crew cut generally more 
appealing to men.  Both women and men would, however, 
be able to choose either cut.  
This is not, however, the only, or perhaps even the 
most likely, response to the trait equality requirement.  If 
employers are uncomfortable with gender bending 
behavior—either because of their own sensibilities or 
because they think it will offend their customers—they may 
choose instead to narrow the range of trait options available 
to their employees to only those that the employer will find 
acceptable when possessed by either sex.114  The options, in 
                                                 
114   This is a possibility that Case herself clearly recognizes.  See Case, 
supra note __ at 8.  Another alternative would be for employers to 
increase their pre-employment screening measures so as to exclude 
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other words, will converge toward an  androgynous mean.  
The employer who does not want to employ men in bob 
haircuts will simply not make this an option under its dress 
code, even if it does not mind women wearing them. The 
result is not more options for men to gender bend but fewer 
traditionally gender conforming options for women.   
Such androgynous workplace rules are, moreover, 
unlikely to be sex neutral in their costs.  Even assuming, as I 
have above, that trait equality advocates would limit the 
kind of neutral requirements that employers could impose 
so as to prohibit trait requirements that would make public 
participation disproportionately costly for individuals of one 
sex or the other, there is in fact no dress, grooming, or trait 
requirement that does not burden individuals of one sex 
more than the other.  There really is no single hairstyle that 
looks equally good and is equally socially acceptable on 
women and men.  Short hairstyles for women tend to be 
significantly more layered and styled than short hairstyles 
on men.  Clothing styles may appear relatively androgynous 
but even there if we were really to put women and men in 
exactly the same clothes with exactly the same cuts one sex 
or the other would look a bit weird.  The dark blue pants suit 
women wear is really not exactly the same as the dark blue 
pants suit that men wear. It is generally cut more narrowly 
in the jacket, and paired with pants that are narrower at the 
waist and fuller at the hips.  Sex neutral requirements will, 
therefore, almost never be sex neutral in their costs. 
This push in the name of antidiscrimination toward 
androgyny also leads to a sub pareto optimal outcome in the 
sense that some women and men would be made better off 
and none would be made worse off if the employer were 
                                                                                                             
applicants with a propensity to gender bend.  In this way, employers 
could maintain more expansive clothing and grooming options for their 
employees while ensuring that the individuals they hire will not in fact 
engage in gender bending behavior.  Under this approach, individuals 
with a desire to gender bend will not be formally prevented from doing 
so, they simply will not be hired.  I thank Max Schanzenbach for 
emphasizing this point to me.  
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permitted to institute some sex-specific rules.  Both women 
and men would then be permitted to engage in certain types 
of gender normative behavior.  Certainly cross-dressing men 
would not be better off under limited sex-specific 
employment rules permitting women but not men to wear 
dresses, but nor are they terribly well off under rules 
requiring androgynous dress from everyone.  Equating 
nondiscrimination with strict neutrality is likely to diminish 
the freedom of everyone while increasing that of no one.  
The costs to liberty are high, and they are neither required 
nor justified by Title VII’s mandate of equality. 
In sum, the trait equality approach to trait 
discrimination is initially appealing because of its formal 
equality ring and its seeming structural simplicity.  Upon 
closer scrutiny, however, trait equality proves to be neither 
simple to understand nor easy to defend.  To the extent it is 
based on the premise that like must be treated alike, the 
approach collapses into a controversial and indeterminate 
naming game.  To the extent it is based not on the premise of 
sameness but on the illegitimacy of certain types of 
difference, the approach mistakenly and needlessly equates 
the existence of gender norms with sex inequality.  This 
equation and its requirement of formal neutrality is likely to 
cost us all much, it is likely to gain gender benders little, and 
it is unnecessary for the substantive sex equality Title VII 
requires.  In the following sections, therefore, I search for a 
better response to the question of when sex-specific trait 
discrimination is actionable sex discrimination.     
 
III. Trait-Focused Approaches  
 This section considers two narrower approaches to 
the problem of sex-specific trait discrimination, both of 
which focus on the nature of the particular trait that is at 
issue.  The first approach makes sex-specific trait 
discrimination actionable only when the trait is an 
immutable characteristic or a fundamental right.  The second 
approach makes trait discrimination actionable when the 
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trait is integral to one’s gender identity.  Both approaches 
would find actionable significantly less conduct than is 
currently prohibited by courts.     
 
A. Immutable Traits/Fundamental Rights 
Eighteen years before the Supreme Court articulated 
its sex stereotyping/trait equality rationale in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, it offered a very similar rationale in 
the case of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation.115  Martin 
Marietta involved a challenge to the company’s policy of 
refusing to accept job applications from women with pre-
school age children while at the same time hiring men with 
pre-school age children.116  Martin Marietta was a clear case 
of sex-specific trait discrimination.  The company did not bar 
women as a general matter from employment, and indeed 
regularly hired women. 117  The company simply refused to 
hire women, and only women, with young children.  
 The Supreme Court held that Martin Marietta’s hiring 
policy would constitute impermissible sex discrimination in 
violation Title VII unless the company could show that such 
discrimination was permissible under Title VII’s bona fide 
occupational qualification exception.118  The Court held that 
it was a violation of Title VII for an employer to have 
different hiring criteria for women and men and to refuse to 
hire women for possessing traits and attributes which were 
not disqualifying when possessed by men.119  According to 
                                                 
115  400 U.S. 542 (1972). 
116  Id. at 543.     
117  In fact, at the time Phillips applied for the position of assembly 
trainee, 70-75% of the applicants for the position were women and 75-
80% of those hired for the position were women.  Id. 
118  Id. at 544.  The court explained that “[t]he existence of  . . . conflicting 
family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job performance for 
a woman than for a man, could arguably be a basis for distinction under 
§703(e) of the Act.  But that is a matter of evidence tending to show that 
the condition in question ‘is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business 
or enterprise.’”  Id. 
119  Id. 
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the Court, “Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
requires that persons of like qualifications be given 
employment opportunities irrespective of their sex.  The 
Court of Appeals therefore erred in reading this section as 
permitting one hiring policy for women and another for 
men—each having pre-school-age children.”120 
Subsequently, some courts simply followed the plain 
language of the Supreme Court’s decision in Martin Marietta 
interpreting it as prohibiting any and all sex-specific trait 
requirements and requiring the kind of formal neutrality of 
the trait equality approach.121  More commonly, however, 
courts interpreted Martin Marietta narrowly as prohibiting 
                                                 
120  Id.  The discrimination made actionable in Martin Marietta often came 
to be called “sex-plus” discrimination.  The term was coined by the Fifth 
Circuit’s Chief Judge Brown in his dissent to the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
not to rehear the Martin Marietta case.  Brown argued against the appeals 
court panel’s decision allowing the employer to engage in sex-based trait 
discrimination contending that “[i]f ‘sex-plus’ stands, [Title VII] is dead.”  
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown 
dissent).  See generally, Regina E. Gray, The Rise and Fall of the ‘Sex-Plus’ 
Discrimination Theory: An Analysis of Fisher v. Vassar College, 42 HOW. L.J. 
71 n.34 (1998); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment 
Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of 
Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 371 n. 101 (2001). 
121  In a sense, some courts interpreted Martin Marietta as requiring the 
trait equality discussed in the last section.  See e.g., Sprogis v. United Air 
Lines Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (relying on Martin Marietta to 
hold that a no marriage rule applied to female but not male flight 
attendants violates Title VII because “in forbidding employers to 
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended 
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes”); Aros v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 664 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (holding that a dress and 
grooming code constitutes sex discrimination when applied differently 
to women and men); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, 337 F. Supp. 1357 
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (requiring short hair on men but not on women violates 
Title VII); Roberts v. General Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1971) 
(allowing female employees to wear hairnets but requiring men to wear 
hats—and therefore keep their hair short—violates Title VII).   
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only sex-specific trait discrimination based on  immutable 
characteristics or fundamental rights.122  
 The Fifth Circuit most clearly articulated this 
narrower approach in the case of Willingham v. Macon 
Telegraph Publishing Company.123  Willingham involved a 
challenge brought by a male job applicant who was denied 
employment because his long hair violated the company’s 
grooming code.  The company refused to hire men with long 
hair but not women with long hair.124  In affirming the 
district court’s judgment in favor of the employer, and 
upholding the company’s grooming code, the court 
explained that “a line must be drawn between distinctions 
grounded on fundamental rights . . . and those interfering 
with the manner in which an employer exercises his 
judgment as to the way to operate a business.”125  The court 
held that while Title VII protected against sex-specific trait 
discrimination which targeted traits that were particularly 
important—namely immutable characteristics and 
fundamental rights—Title VII did not protect all trait-based 
discrimination whereby an employer chose to single out a 
particular subset of women or men for adverse treatment.  
The court explained: 
Equal employment opportunity may be 
secured only when employers are barred from 
                                                 
122  See generally Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal 
Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers who are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77 (2003) (noting that the ‘plus’ in “sex-plus’ cases 
must be “either a fundamental right, such as having children or 
marrying, or an immutable physical characteristic”); Gray, supra note __ 
at 84 (“The requirement that the ‘plus’ in a ‘sex-plus’ case consist of an 
‘immutable characteristic’ or a ‘fundamental right’ was established in 
cases challenging employers’ grooming/dress code regulations”); 
Kessler, supra note __  at 392 (“Courts have found that sex-plus 
discrimination is a violation of Title VII only if the ‘plus,’ or facially 
neutral characteristic, is either a fundamental right or an immutable 
physical characteristic”). 
123  507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975). 
124  Id. at 1087-88. 
125  Id. at 1091. 
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discriminating against employees on the basis 
of immutable characteristics, such as race and 
national origin.  Similarly, an employer cannot 
have one hiring policy for men and another for 
women if the distinction is based on some 
fundamental right.  But a hiring policy that 
distinguishes on some other ground, such as 
grooming codes or length of hair, is related 
more closely to the employer’s choice of how 
to run his business than to equality of 
opportunity.126 
 
 The immutable characteristic/fundamental right 
limitation on actionable trait discrimination avoids some of 
the conceptual and normative difficulties of the trait equality 
approach. The approach, however, is radically under 
inclusive in the types of trait discrimination it would treat as 
actionable.   
A narrow focus on trait discrimination based on 
immutable characteristics or fundamental rights, would, for 
example have denied protection to Ann Hopkins, and other 
women who suffer adverse job consequences because they 
are aggressive.127  Aggressiveness is not an immutable 
                                                 
126  Id. at 1091.  The court continued to explain: “Private employers are 
prohibited from using different hiring policies for men and women only 
when the distinctions used relate to immutable characteristics or legally 
protected rights.  While of course not impervious to judicial scrutiny, 
even those distinctions do not violate Sec. 703(a) if they are applied to 
both sexes.” Id. at 1092-93.  Other courts followed a similar post-Martin 
Marietta approach.  See generally Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 
F.2d 1115, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that discrimination based on 
immutable sex-based characteristics is prohibited but an employee “may 
be required to conform to reasonable grooming standards designed to 
further the employing company’s interest”); Jarell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 
577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that employer’s sex-specific weight 
requirements did not violate Title VII because weight is not an 
immutable characteristic). 
127  This approach would also find non actionable discrimination against 
effeminate men.  See e.g., Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th 
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characteristic.  Someone who is predisposed to be aggressive 
and competitive can train herself to be more docile and 
cooperative.  Being aggressive is also clearly not a protected 
fundamental right.128  As a result, under the 
integral/fundamental trait approach, an employer would be 
free to single out aggressive women for adverse 
employment treatment.  An employer would not violate 
Title VII by hiring women generally but simply refusing to 
hire aggressive women.  Of course, as the Supreme Court 
itself recognized in Price Waterhouse, failure to protect 
aggressive women from discrimination under Title VII puts 
all women in something of a catch-22.  They can be refused 
employment because they are aggressive and then refused 
career advancement  because they are not.  Allowing trait 
discrimination aimed at aggressive women effectively 
undermines the ability of all women to compete in the 
workplace against men by denying them a characteristic that 
is often needed to succeed.  Such a narrow approach to trait-
based discrimination simply cannot be consistent with Title 
VII’s goal of ensuring that women and men will compete in 
the work world on equal footing.129  
 
B. Group-Identity Traits 
A different approach would be to make sex-specific 
trait discrimination actionable only when the trait for which 
certain women (or men) are singled out is one that is integral 
to their gender-group identity.  The focus of this approach is 
                                                                                                             
Cir. 1978) (relying on Willingham v. Macon Telegraph to hold that 
discrimination against effeminate men was not actionable because such 
sex-specific trait discrimination was impermissible only when the trait 
involved was a fundamental right or an immutable characteristic). 
128  Fundamental rights have been limited to such things as marrying and 
having children.  See e.g., Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091. 
129  The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse necessarily rejected the 
immutable trait/fundamental right approach from Martin Marietta. 
Strangely, however, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse did not even 
mention Martin Marietta or the line of cases interpreting it so narrowly.  
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.  
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on discrimination based on traits that for social and cultural 
reasons are strongly associated with a particular group 
rather than on traits that for biological reasons are unique to 
a particular race or sex group.  Discrimination based on the 
latter kind of traits are generally treated as simple types of 
ontological discrimination.130   
Group-identity arguments of this sort are most often 
articulated and endorsed as a way of expanding Title VII’s 
protection in race and national origin discrimination cases 
involving facially neutral trait requirements.  Barbara Flagg 
and Paulette Caldwell, for example, both argue that Title VII 
should prohibit discrimination based on race-oriented or 
race-expressive traits in addition to discrimination based on 
race per se.131  Flagg contends that Title VII is currently a 
useful tool for black employees who act white and are 
nonetheless treated differently because of their skin color, 
but it is a much less effective tool for black employees who 
act in certain racially identified ways and are discriminated 
against because of these behavioral traits.132  Flagg argues 
                                                 
130  See e.g., the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, supra note __ (defining 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as a form of sex 
discrimination), Rogers, supra note __ (suggesting in dicta that 
discrimination based on a natural black hairstyle would constitute race 
discrimination).  
131  See Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently 
White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L. J. 2009, 2015 (1995); Paulette 
M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and 
Gender, 1991 Duke L.J. 365 (1991).  See also Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 
YALE L. J. 769, 885-96 (arguing for Title VII protection against 
discrimination based on mutable traits that are constitutive of group 
identity).  
132  Flagg offers for example the actual stories of two African American 
sisters, Yvonne Taylor and Keisha Akbar (who had changed her name 
from Deborah Taylor).  Both sisters were smart and skillful in their 
respective jobs, though they related to and expressed their racial 
identities very differently.  Yvonne adopted a personal style that “fell 
well within the bounds of whites’ cultural expectations.  Id. at 2009.  Her 
speech, dress, hairstyle and attitudes matched white norms.  Id. at 2009.  
Keisha, in comparison, placed a greater emphasis on her African  
heritage.  In addition to changing her name, Keisha “adopted speech and 
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that Title VII should prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
“personal characteristics that . . . intersect seamlessly with 
[one’s racial] self-definition.”133 
Caldwell makes a similar argument.  Caldwell 
focuses her criticism on the case of Rogers v. American 
Airlines.134  Renee Rogers worked as an airport operations 
agent for American Airlines.  She filed suit challenging 
American’s grooming policy which prohibited employees in 
high customer contact positions from wearing an all-braided 
hairstyle.135  Rogers argued that the policy discriminated 
against her as a woman, and, more specifically, as a black 
woman because of the historical and cultural significance a 
braided, or cornrow, hairstyle had for black women.136   
Indeed, Rogers contended that the cornrows hairstyle “’has 
been and continues to be part of the cultural and historical 
essence of Black American women.’”137  The district court 
rejected Roger’s discrimination claim concluding that 
American’s policy, which applied neutrally to women and 
men of all races, did not on its face discriminate in violation 
of Title VII.138  Caldwell criticizes the court’s decision for 
                                                                                                             
grooming patterns consistent with [her] cultural perspective” and 
interpreted current events as instances of racism more than her white co-
workers.  Id. at 2010-11 and nn. 4-5.  Both sisters faced adverse 
employment actions that seemed race related.  Flagg notes that while 
Yvonne could easily frame a fairly standard disparate treatment claim 
because of her compliance with white norms, Keisha would have a very 
difficult time framing such a claim under existing judicial interpretations 
of Title VII.  Id. at 2014-15.  
133  Id. at 2012. Flagg refers to adverse employment actions which result 
from an individual possessing traits or attributes associated with racial 
identity and deviating from white cultural norms as “transparently 
white decisionmaking.”  Id. at 2029 (according to Flagg, “[t]ransparently 
white decisionmaking consists of the unconscious use of criteria of 
decision that are more strongly associated with whites than with 
nonwhites”). 
134  527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). 
135 527 F. Supp. at 231. 
136  527 F. Supp. at 231. 
137  527 F. Supp. at 232. 
138  527 F. Supp. at 231-32. 
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failing to recognize and take seriously the connection 
between braided hairstyles and black women’s racial 
identity and for failing to extend Title VII protection to such 
group-identified traits.139 
Juan Perea makes a similar argument in the context of 
Title VII’s bar on national origin discrimination.140  Perea 
contends that most of the discrimination faced by ethnic 
minorities results from their possession of certain traits, not 
from the fact of their national origin or place of birth.141  As a 
result, he argues, Title VII should protect against 
discrimination based on “physical and cultural 
characteristics that make a social group distinctive either in 
group members’ eyes or in the view of outsiders.”142  Perea 
describes such characteristics as including, but not limited 
to: “race, national origin, ancestry, language, religion, shared 
history, traditions, values, and symbols, all of which 
contribute to a sense of distinctiveness among members of 
the group.”143 
Drucilla Cornell and William Bratton make a similar 
argument for extending Title VII to prohibit workplace rules 
that penalize employees for speaking a language other than 
English.144  They argue that “the legal system should treat 
language as a fundamental identification encompassed by 
                                                 
139  Caldwell explains that “[w]herever they exist in the world, black 
women braid their hair. They have done so in the United States for more 
than four centuries.  African in origin, the practice of braiding is as 
American—black American—as sweet potato pie.”  Caldwell, supra note 
__  at 379.  Indeed, Caldwell argues, “a black woman’s choice of 
hairstyle, is associated in the minds of the women themselves and others 
with an extension of the personality, a dignitary interest.”  Id. at 386-87.   
140  Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” 
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1994). 
141  Id. at 839. 
142  Id. at 833. 
143  Id. at 833. 
144  See Drucilla Cornell and William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and 
Intrinsic Wrongs of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of 
Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 595 (1999). 
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each person’s right of personhood.”145  Title VII should, 
therefore, prohibit English-only workplace regulations 
because of “the value of linguistic and cultural 
identifications to the individual person.”146  While Flagg and 
Caldwell argue that protections of this sort are already called 
for under Title VII’s existing language, 147 Cornell and 
Bratton, along with Perea, argue for an explicit expansion of 
Title VII to include certain group-identified traits.148    
The EEOC has been fairly sympathetic to the idea that 
group-identity-related traits should be protected under Title 
VII.  Indeed, in its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of 
National Origin, the EEOC defined national origin 
discrimination as “including, but not limited to, the denial of 
equal employment opportunity because of an individual’s, 
or his or her ancestor’s, place of origin; or because an 
individual has the physical, cultural, or linguistic 
                                                 
145  Id. at 604.  See also Linda M. Mealey, English-Only Rules and “Innocent” 
Employers: Clarifying National Origin Discrimination and Disparate Impact 
Theory Under Title VII, 74 MINN. L. REV. 387 (1989) (arguing that “it is 
inappropriate to compare language with mutable characteristics such as 
hairstyle.  Language is more closely analogous to religion.  Both are 
‘mutable,’ yet both go to the core of the person and are not as easily 
changed as hairstyle”). 
146  Cornell and Bratton, supra note __ at 602. 
147  Flagg argues that a “pluralist” interpretation of Title VII which 
protects individuals from discrimination for possessing racially 
identified traits and deviating from white cultural norms is in fact 
“consistent with Title VII as written.”  Flagg, supra note __  at 2037.  
Although Caldwell makes this point less explicitly, she too seems to 
believe that the Rogers decision was erroneously decided under existing 
antidiscrimination law.  See Caldwell, supra note __ at 387 (contending 
that “[a]ntidiscrimination law should be, and at its best  is, directed 
toward the behavioral manifestations of such negative associations” with 
racially identified traits). 
148  Perea, supra note __ at 832.  Perea proposes modifying Title VII to 
read: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, or ethnic traits.”  Id. at 861.  
See also Cornell and Bratton, supra note __ at 603-04. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15
 
 
TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX  DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
 
 65
characteristics of a national origin group.”149  The agency 
stressed that “the primary language of an individual is often 
an essential national origin characteristic,”150 and English-
only workplace rules “disadvantage[] an individual’s 
employment opportunities on the basis of national 
origin.”151  According to the EEOC, accent discrimination 
could also, in some instances, constitute national origin 
discrimination.152  
Courts, however, have been much less favorable 
toward this group-identity approach to antidiscrimination 
law.  In Rogers the district court accepted, for the purposes of 
considering the defendant’s motion to dismiss, Roger’s 
contention about the integraleness of cornrows to black 
women’s cultural and historical identity.153  Nonetheless, the 
court upheld American’s policy against cornrows stressing 
both the neutrality of the policy--it applied to both sexes and 
all races—and the fact that the trait at issue was not 
immutable—even if it was “socioculturally associated with a 
particular race.”154  
In Garcia v. Gloor, the Fifth Circuit rejected the claim 
of a Mexican-American employee that his employer’s rule 
prohibiting bilingual employees engaged in sales work from 
speaking Spanish on the job constituted discrimination on 
the basis of national origin.155  Garcia argued that the 
Spanish language “was the most important aspect of ethnic 
identification for Mexican-Americans” so that the policy 
against speaking Spanish constituted national origin 
                                                 
149  See 29 C.F.R.1606.1.  
150  29 C.F.R. 1606.7(a). 
151  29 C.F.R. 1606.7(a). 
152  29 C.F.R. at 1606.6(b)(1).   
153  Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232. 
154  The court explained: “An all-braided hair style is an ‘easily changed 
characteristic,’ and, even if socioculturally associated with a particular 
race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis for distinctions in the 
application of employment practices by an employer.”  Rogers, 527 F. 
Supp. at 232.   
155  618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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discrimination against Mexican Americans.156  The court, 
however, refused to treat discrimination based on language 
use as national origin discrimination.  According to the 
court, “Neither the statute nor the common understanding 
equates national origin with the language that one chooses 
to speak.”157  “National origin,” the court emphasized, “must 
not be confused with ethnic or sociocultural traits . . . .”158 
                                                 
156  Id. at 267. 
157  Id. at 268.  The court did stress, however, that this case involved a 
plaintiff who was “fully bilingual” and deliberately chose to speak 
Spanish instead of English while at work.  Id. at 268.  To the court this 
distinguished the case sharply from one involving a plaintiff who did 
not speak English at all.  Id. at 270.  The court noted that there might be 
circumstances in which “the ability to speak or the speaking of a 
language other than English might be equated with national origin” and 
suggested that “[t]he refusal to hire applicants who cannot speak English 
. . . if the jobs they seek can be performed without knowledge of that 
language” might be one example.  Id. at 269-70. 
158  Id. at 269.   See also Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487-88 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that employer’s English only policy 
as applied to bilingual employees had a disparate impact based on 
national origin because the court held that the adverse effects were not 
significant enough to be actionable, but also noting in dicta that Title VII 
“does not protect the ability of workers to express their cultural heritage 
at the workplace”); Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 
596-99 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that employer’s refusal to hire otherwise 
qualified applicant because of his foreign accent did not constitute 
national origin discrimination because the accent materially affected his 
ability to perform the job).  Cf.  Carino v. University of Oklahoma Bd. of 
Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that employee had 
proven actionable discrimination based on his “national origin and 
related accent” and noting that “[a] foreign accent that does not interfere 
with a Title VII claimant’s ability to perform duties of the position he has 
been denied is not a legitimate justification for adverse employment 
decisions”);  Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District, 
838 F.2d 1031, 1044 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that employer’s English-only 
policy violated Title VII by causing a disparate impact on the basis of 
national origin without business necessity and noting that “English-only 
rules generally have an adverse impact on protected groups and 
ordinarily constitute discriminatory conditions of employment”), vacated 
as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).  
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Both Rogers and Gloor involved neutral rather than 
group-specific trait discrimination in that the challenged 
employment rules applied to all employees.  As a result, 
both plaintiffs were able to raise disparate impact as well as 
disparate treatment challenges.159  In both cases, however, 
the courts concluded that the traits at issue—namely 
hairstyle and choice of language—did not warrant 
protection under the disparate impact doctrine.  The Rogers 
decision is vague and does not distinguish clearly between 
its disparate impact and disparate treatment analysis.  
Nevertheless, the opinion suggests two reasons for 
dismissing Rogers’s disparate impact claim.  First, Rogers 
did not actually allege that the no cornrows policy 
disproportionately affected black people.160  Second, the 
disparate harm that Rogers did allege, namely an identity 
harm to black women, was not one the court was willing to 
recognize under the disparate impact framework.  The court 
focused instead on the mechanical ease with which black 
women could change their hairstyle and thereby avoid 
adverse impact.  According to the court, because “[a]n all-
braided hair style is an easily changed characteristic,” 
disadvantageous treatment based on the trait did not 
constitute an adverse impact for disparate impact 
purposes.161    
In Gloor the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
that the English-only rule had a disparate impact on 
Hispanic-Americans by likewise focusing on the mutability 
of the trait—speaking Spanish—at issue.  According to the 
court, “there is no disparate impact if the rule is one that the 
                                                 
159  EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(emphasizing that a disparate impact claim requires the identification of 
a specific facially-neutral practice responsible for the group-based 
disparity).   
160  The court noted: “Plaintiff does not allege that an all-braided hair 
style is worn exclusively or even predominantly by black people.”  
Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232. 
161  Id. at 232 (internal quotations omitted). 
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affected employee can readily observe and nonobservance is 
a matter of individual preference.”162   
Although I have been focusing on group-specific 
forms of trait discrimination challenged under the disparate 
treatment framework rather than on neutral forms of trait 
discrimination challenged under the disparate impact 
framework, it is worth noting that these two types of trait 
discrimination and the legal analyses they engender may not 
be as distinct as they at first seem.  There may, for example, 
be instances in which a hiring requirement is stated 
neutrally but works in practice to exclude only individuals 
of a particular sex or race.  It may not be clear in such cases 
whether the requirement should be treated as neutral or 
group-specific.163  Moreover, the judgment at the core of 
both a disparate impact and disparate treatment based trait 
discrimination claim may in fact be the same.  A plaintiff 
challenging a group-neutral form of trait discrimination 
under the disparate impact doctrine must show, as a 
preliminary matter, that the employment requirement at 
issue causes a disparate adverse impact on individuals of a 
particular protected group.  In other words, the plaintiff 
must show both disparity and adversity sufficiently severe 
to be worth the court’s attention. 164  The courts in Rogers and 
                                                 
162  Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270.   
163  This was, of course, the question faced by the Supreme Court in 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).  The employer’s 
disability plan looked sex neutral to the extent that it denied pregnancy 
benefits for women and men.  It looked sex specific to the extent that it 
denied women medical benefits while granting men benefits for 
similarly disabling conditions.  One could also imagine a company 
policy prohibiting a particular kind of hairstyle which in fact could only 
be worn by black (or white) women.  Courts there too would be faced 
with the question of whether such a policy was in fact race-neutral or 
race-specific. 
164  See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(explaining that “[t]he crux of the dispute between Spun Steak and the 
Spanish-speaking employees, . . ., is not over whether Hispanic workers 
will disproportionately bear any adverse effects of the policy; rather, the 
dispute centers on whether the policy causes any adverse effects at all, 
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Gloor concluded that the required adversity only existed 
when individuals of a particular group were being 
disproportionately harmed for possessing traits that were 
immutable.165  Sufficient adversity did not exist when 
individuals were disadvantaged because of traits that they 
could simply choose to change. 166  In fact, an immutability 
requirement is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s 
finding of disparate impact liability in Griggs v. Duke 
Power.167  Certainly the lack of a high school diploma, which 
was one trait being challenged in Griggs, is a mutable 
characteristic.  What really seems to be at issue in this first 
level of disparate impact analysis is, therefore, not the 
immutability of the group-associated trait per se, but a more 
vague judicial determination that the trait at issue is one that 
individuals must not, at least not unnecessarily, be 
disadvantaged for possessing.  If the trait is deemed worthy 
of protection, the employer can only make employment 
decisions based on it if doing so satisfies the business 
necessity requirement.168  The core question under both 
                                                                                                             
and if it does, whether the effects are significant,” and ultimately 
rejecting bilingual employees’ disparate impact challenge to employer’s 
English-only rule). 
165  See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232; Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270.   
166   See Rogers, 527 F. Supp at 232 (emphasizing that cornrows were 
different from the immutable characteristics entitled to protection under 
Title VII because cornrows are “not the product of natural hair growth 
but of artifice”);  Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270 (emphasizing that “Mr. Garcia 
could readily comply with the speak-English-only rule; as to him 
nonobservance was a mater of choice”). 
167  Griggs v. Duke Power, 410 U.S. 424 (1971). 
168  Once a court recognizes that a particular trait requirement causes a 
legally cognizable disparate impact on a protected group, the employer 
must respond by showing that the trait requirement satisfies some 
business necessity.  An employer would probably not, however, be able 
to justify the trait requirement and resulting disparate impact by arguing 
that its customers simply do not like dealing with employees with that 
trait.  Once the trait is deemed worthy of protection under the disparate 
impact framework (because disadvantage based on the trait is deemed a 
recognizable adversity), such preferences themselves would probably 
look like a form of status discrimination.  Consider, for example, a court 
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disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses really 
becomes whether the trait at issue is one an individual 
should be protected in possessing.  The answer to this 
question is distinct from the framework under which the 
trait discrimination claim is brought. 
Despite scholars’, if not courts’, support for a group-
identity approach to trait discrimination in race and national 
origin cases, there are significant practical and theoretical 
problems with this approach.  While most of the problems 
apply regardless of whether this approach is applied in race, 
national origin, or sex discrimination cases, and regardless of 
whether the trait discrimination at issue is facially neutral or 
group-specific, I will focus in this section on why this group-
identity approach is particularly inadequate for responding 
to sex-specific forms of trait discrimination.   
                                                                                                             
faced with a claim similar to that raised in Rogers except in this case the 
court concludes that the plaintiff has shown a legally cognizable 
disparate impact on black women stemming from the no cornrows 
policy.  In other words, the court concludes that the wearing of 
cornrows, like the lack of a high school diploma, is a trait which 
individuals should not simply be expected to change but one which they 
are entitled to some protection in possessing.  If the court recognizes the 
disparate impact caused by the no cornrows policy, it is unlikely then 
that the employer could defend this policy by showing that customers do 
not like dealing with people with cornrows.  Once cornrows are treated 
as a trait important enough to warrant some protection when possessed 
by black women, then customer preferences not to deal with people with 
this trait become a delegitimized form of status discrimination.  
Consider, a different example.  An employer has a prohibition on hiring 
individuals who wear head coverings to work.  Plaintiffs sue arguing 
that the prohibition has a disparate impact on Muslim women.  The 
court agrees that the prohibition causes a disparate, and sufficiently 
adverse, impact on Muslim women because of their religion.  Once the 
court makes this determination, it is unlikely that the employer would 
then be able to justify its no headscarves policy by pointing to its 
customers’ preferences not to deal with employee’s in headscarves.  
Head scarves become associated with Muslim women in such a way that 
makes anti-headscarf customer preferences seem like impermissible 
status discrimination. 
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The first and most obvious difficulty with this 
approach is identifying traits that are integral to one’s 
identity as a woman or man.  Identifying traits that are 
integral to group identity is difficult when the group at issue 
is race- or national origin-based, but it is probably even more 
difficult when the group at issue is gender-based.  Is wearing 
dresses, jewelry or makeup integral to women’s gender 
identity?  Or are these traits too trivial to be deemed critical 
to gender-identity?  Is talking in relational terms and placing 
a priority on relationships rather than informal rights 
integral to women’s gender identity?169  Are any traits other 
than those distinctly related to biology and reproduction 
really integral to women’s group identity?170   
For a trait to be considered integral to group identity 
must the trait be possessed by 50% of the members of the 
group, 75% of the members, 90% of the members or just 
some lesser “critical mass” of members?171  How long must 
the trait have been associated with the group’s shared 
identity?  Does it matter if a trait has been widely associated 
with the group for 10 years or 100 years?172 
                                                 
169  Carol Gilligan famously argued that women more than men think of 
moral problems as arising from “conflicting responsibilities rather than 
from competing rights and requir[ing] for [their] resolution a mode of 
thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and 
abstract.”  CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 19 (1982). 
170  See Yoshino, supra note __ 906-913 (describing the demand that 
women make pregnancy and motherhood easy to ignore as a kind of sex 
discrimination in which women are required to “mute their identities”). 
171  Juan Perea raised this point when he asked: “how much correlation is 
enough to establish that an ethnic trait is actually a proxy for prohibited 
race or national origin discrimination?  If fifty percent of the members of 
an ethnic group share a trait, is this sufficient for the trait to function as a 
proxy for the ethnic group?  If two-thirds of American  Latinos are 
bilingual, is this enough to establish Spanish English bilingualism as a 
proxy for Latino ethnicity?  Is ninety percent required?” Perea, supra note 
__ at 852. 
172  In Rogers, for example, the district court emphasized that the 
plaintiff’s braided hairstyle had only recently become “popularized” (by 
Cicely Tyson and then by Bo Derek).  Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.  
Paulette Caldwell, however, in arguing that the court should have 
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Even if one could determine some method for 
identifying group-integral traits that went beyond the purely 
biological, equating discrimination based on these traits with 
sex discrimination serves to essentialize and define women 
in terms of the traits they have been historically allowed to 
have.  Protecting these socially identified traits reinforces 
women’s commitment to them.  Such traits may, however, 
be the product of women’s subordinate social status, and 
may not in any deeper way represent “authentic” women’s 
culture. 173  Moreover, and more importantly, these may not 
be traits that women should or do want to retain. 
Catharine MacKinnon has made precisely this point 
in response to Carol Gilligan’s work describing women’s 
different and more relational moral voice as compared to 
men.  MacKinnon criticizes the idea that women should seek 
to reify in any way the traits that have historically 
distinguished them from men.  “For women to affirm 
difference,” she contends, “when difference means 
dominance, as it does with gender, means to affirm the 
qualities and characteristics of powerlessness.”174 
Richard Ford makes a similar point with respect to 
racially identified traits.  Ford worries about 
“misrecognizing” groups by legally ascribing to them 
cultural traits and attributes that have come to be associated 
with the group over time.  Ford explains that “[t]he harm of 
misrecognition is that members of the misrecognized group 
may internalize the depreciating stereotypes of others.  Such 
individuals, then, may not always appropriately determine 
                                                                                                             
protected plaintiff’s braided hairstyle as a direct extension of her race 
asserted that African American women had worn braided hairstyles for 
more than four centuries.  Caldwell, supra note __  at 379. 
173  As Catharine MacKinnon contends: “Women have a history all right, 
but it is a history both of what was and what was not allowed to be.  So I 
am critical of affirming what we have been, which necessarily is what we 
have been permitted, as if it is women’s, ours, possessive.”  CATHARINE 
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 39 
(1987). 
174  MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED supra note __ at 39. 
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what is fundamental to their identity, or better put, what 
should be fundamental to their identity.”175  Ford is primarily 
concerned with challenging racial hierarchy and 
subordination.  He questions whether legally enshrining 
existing group-identified traits—which may themselves be 
the result of this social subordination—is the best way to end 
racial oppression.176  “It is by no means clear,” Ford argues, 
“that an argument that presumes that blacks or black 
women have a cultural essence as blacks or black women is a 
vehicle of racial empowerment.”177  
Not only does the group-identity approach to trait 
discrimination essentialize group members in ways that may 
not be either authentic or beneficial, it also permits 
individual plaintiffs, through the use of private lawsuits, to 
do the defining.  Individual plaintiffs and individual courts 
will effectively have the power to decide often contested 
questions about what traits and attributes are group-
identified.  Rather than forcing the group as a collective to 
determine its identity and to confront inner-group conflicts, 
the group-identity approach to trait discrimination 
effectively gives individual plaintiffs and judges the power 
to define what may be highly contested group identities.178  
                                                 
175   Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference” : A Reluctant Critique of Legal 
Identity Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM/ LEFT CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown & Janet 
Halley eds.) 55 (2002). 
176   See Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not? 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 
1805 (2003) (“antiracism’s goal must be to dismantle the practices and 
institutions that continue to produce and to reinforce racial 
subordination—not to safeguard (and thereby fix) individuals or groups 
in their ascribed characteristics”). 
177  Ford, Beyond Difference, supra note __ at 40 
178  Ford makes this point with respect to the question of whether 
cornrows should be treated as a race-identified trait.  Ford notes: 
“Suppose some black women employed by American Airlines wished to 
wear cornrows and advance the political message they ostensibly 
embody, and others thought cornrows damaged the interests of black 
women in particular and reflected badly on the race as a whole. . . . Now 
Roger’s claim is no longer plausibly described as a claim on behalf of 
black women.  Instead, it is a claim on behalf of some black women over 
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In fact, the group-identity approach forces courts to make 
decisions among potentially competing claims about what 
constitutes group identity.179  These decisions then affect not 
only the individual litigants but all members of the group 
whose cultural identity has, as a result, been more sharply 
defined.   
On a practical level, the group-identity approach is 
inadequate as a response to sex-specific trait discrimination 
because this approach would not protect women who are 
singled out for adverse treatment precisely because they 
deviate from gender stereotypes. For example, while it is not 
clear what traits might be considered integral to women’s 
gender-group identity, it is certainly the case that 
aggressiveness and competitiveness would not be among 
them.  A court interpreting Title VII to protect only group-
integral traits would not, therefore, protect Ann Hopkins 
and other women harmed because of their deviation from 
traditional gender norms.  As was the case with the 
immutable/fundamental trait approach, such a narrow 
response to trait discrimination is not consistent with Title 
VII’s antidiscrimination goals.  Indeed, the group-identity 
approach, given its tendency to reify existing gender norms, 
is more likely to entrench than to challenge group-based 
subordination.   
 
IV. Mechanism of Harm Approach 
 An alternative to the approaches discussed in the last 
section is to focus not on the nature of the trait for which 
women (or men) are harmed, but on the mechanism by 
which they are harmed.  Under this approach, if a group of 
                                                                                                             
the possible objections of other black women.”  Ford, Beyond Difference 
supra note __ at 39. 
179  See Ford, Race as Culture? supra note __ at 1811 (“The rights argument 
that protects culture as the authentic expression of the individual litigant 
must invite—in fact it must require—courts to determine which 
expressions are authentic and therefore deserving of protection.  The 
result will often be to discredit anyone who does not fit the culture style 
ascribed to her racial group”). 
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women is treated worse than other women and men in the 
workplace, what is important for determining whether such 
treatment constitutes actionable sex discrimination is not 
why the women were singled out but the means by which 
they were harmed.  If the mechanism of harm is sexualized 
abuse and harassment, then the discrimination is considered 
to be because of sex under the meaning of Title VII.  
Otherwise, the trait discrimination is not actionable.  As 
Vicki Schultz has shown, this was effectively the approach 
courts took in determining when harassment creating a 
hostile work environment was actionable. 180  Harassing 
conduct that was sexual in nature was deemed to be because 
of sex, and potentially actionable under Title VII,181 while 
conduct that was not sexual in nature was deemed 
necessarily to not be because of sex.182  
                                                 
180  See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment supra note __  at 1686 
(“The prevailing paradigm for understanding sex-based harassment 
places sexuality—more specifically, male-female sexual advances—at the 
center of the problem”). 
181  The conduct was potentially actionable because the other 
requirements for actionable sexual harassment still had to be shown. In 
order to state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment a 
plaintiff must show: “(1) the harassment was unwelcome; (2) the 
harassment was because of sex; (3) the harassment was sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an 
abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is some basis for imposing liability on 
the employer.”  Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 1998).  See also 
Leibowitz v. New York City Transit Authority, 252 F.3d 179, 189 (2nd Cir. 
2001 (same); Bowman v. Shawnee State University, 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (same); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir. 
1982) (quoted with approval in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 67 (1986).  
182  Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment supra note __ at 1689 
(“Courts consider only sexual advances or other sexual conduct for 
purposes of establishing hostile work environment harassment, and they 
consign less sexual forms of misconduct to a separate disparate 
treatment analysis (if they consider such forms at all)”).  See e.g., King v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 
1990) (holding that discriminatory treatment by one supervisor that was 
sexual in nature was sexual harassment while discriminatory treatment 
by another supervisor that was not sexual in nature was not); Turley v. 
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One initial problem with the mechanism of harm 
approach to trait discrimination is determining when 
conduct is sexual in nature.  Is it sexual for a man to touch a 
woman’s buttocks?183  Is it sexual for a man to stroke a 
woman’s hair?184  Is it sexual for a man to grab another 
man’s genitals?185  Is it sexual for a man to call a woman a 
cunt or a bitch or a broad?186  Is it sexual for a man to call 
another man an asshole or a pussy?187  Is posting 
                                                                                                             
Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1438, 1442 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (holding 
that plaintiff had not established actionable sexual harassment because 
she “was not subjected to harassment of a sexual nature”); Walker v. 
Sullair Corp., 736 F. Supp. 94, 100 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (dismissing plaintiffs 
hostile environment claim based on harassment that was non sexual in 
nature and explaining that “[s]exual harassment based on a hostile work 
environment exists where there are sexual advances”); Downes v. FAA, 
775 F.2d 288, 290 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Sexual harassment is used herein in 
the sense of offensive behavior of a sexual nature which is prohibited by 
Title VII”). 
183  See Campbell v. Board of Regents, 770 F. Supp. 1479, 1486 (D. Kan 1991) 
(treating a man’s slapping of a woman on the buttocks as a sexual act).   
184  See Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that a 
man stroking a woman’s hair at work may or may not be a sexual 
gesture). 
185  See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D. Iowa 1995) 
(stating that “[t]he only thing sexual about ‘bagging’ [one man grabbing 
another man’s genitals] is that the aggressor aims his non-sexual 
aggression at genitals”).  But see Belleville, 119 F.3d at 580 (stating:  
"Frankly we find it hard to think of a situation in which someone 
intentionally grabs another's testicles for reasons entirely unrelated to 
that person's gender."). 
186  See Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 1994 WL 673061, 
*3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 1994) (concluding that a man calling a female 
coworker a “sick bitch” “was not overtly sexual in nature”);  Steiner v. 
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64 (treating man’s references 
to female coworker as a “cunt” and “dumb fucking broad” as “sexually 
explicit and offensive terms,” and contending in dicta that referring to a 
woman as a “worthless broad” was a sexual epithet);  Woerner v. 
Brzeczek, 519 F. Supp. 517, 520 N.D. Ill. 1981) (stating in dicta that male 
supervisor’s reference to a female police office as “that broad” was a 
“sexually-oriented epithet”). 
187  See Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1464 (noting in dicta that calling a man an 
asshole was not a sexual epithet).   
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pornography in the workplace sexual?188  As Schultz has 
noted, courts have had a difficult time agreeing when 
conduct is sexual in nature, particularly when the conduct at 
issue involves crude or sexually suggestive comments as 
opposed to physical touching.189  While some courts have 
taken an expansive view of what constitutes conduct that is 
sexual in nature, other courts have been far more 
restrictive.190   
A more significant problem with the mechanism of 
harm approach is justifying why—beyond simply intuition 
or common sense—conduct that singles out certain women 
or men for particularly harsh treatment should be 
considered to be because of sex simply because the conduct 
is sexual in nature.191  There are two rationales, arising out of 
                                                 
188 See Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(suggesting in dicta that the display of pornographic pictures in the 
workplace is sexual conduct). 
189 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment supra note __ at 1746-
47. 
190  See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3rd Cir. 
1190) (describing "sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic 
materials, sexual[ly] derogatory language" as all actions that are "sexual 
by their very nature").  But see Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
813, 840 (1991) (arguing that "courts tend to define 'sexual' very narrowly 
based on a man's view of a man's acts."). 
191 Often in the sexual harassment context courts simply conclude 
without argument or explanation that conduct that is sexual in nature is 
necessarily because of sex.  See e.g., Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 n. 3  ("The 
intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual 
propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual [sic] 
derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a 
matter of course.  A more fact intensive analysis will be necessary where 
the actions are not sexual by their very nature.");  Konstantopoulos v. 
Westvaco Corp., 893 F. Supp. 1263, 1277 (D. Del. 1994) ("Because at least 
some of the conduct at issue was sexually explicit, it is fair to draw the 
conclusion that, by virtue of the conduct, plaintiff suffered intentional 
discrimination because of her sex");  Cline v. General Elec. Credit Auto 
Lease, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 650, 654 (N.D. Il. 1990) ("Sexual harassment cases 
differ because the discriminatory nature of the charged conduct speaks 
for itself");  Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994) (contending 
that "[s]exual harassment is ordinarily based on sex.  What else could it be 
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the sexual harassment literature, for treating sexual conduct 
as being because of sex.  However, while each rationale 
justifies treating some sexual conduct as being because of 
sex, neither justifies treating all such conduct as being 
because of sex and hence  actionable under Title VII.  
One reason for treating sexual conduct as being 
because of sex emphasizes the role sexuality has played and 
continues to play in maintaining and reinforcing gender 
hierarchy.  The argument is that sexual conduct has been 
used historically and systematically to control and oppress 
women.  Sexual abuse and violence is a, if not the, dominant 
means by which men enforce and maintain their social 
power and control over women.  The use or threat of male 
sexual violence toward women is not isolated and discrete.  
It both reinforces and benefits from a sex-based social 
hierarchy.  As Catharine MacKinnon most notably has 
argued: 
Sexual harassment . . . is not merely a parade of 
interconnected consequences with the potential 
for discrete repetition by other individuals, so 
that a precedent will suffice.  Rather, it is a 
group-defined injury which occurs to many 
different individuals regardless of unique 
qualities or circumstances, in ways that 
connect with other deprivations of the same 
individuals, among all of whom a single 
characteristic—female sex—is shared. Such an 
injury is in essence a group injury.192 
 
As a result of the social importance of sex as a means 
of gender-based control, it does not matter why any 
individual man chooses to sexually harass any individual 
                                                                                                             
based on?"); Belleville, 119 F.3d at 576 ("Arguably, the content of that 
harassment [involving explicit sexual overtures] itself demonstrates the 
nexus to the plaintiff's gender that Title VII requires."). 
192  CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 172 (1979). 
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woman, the fact that the means chosen for the abuse are 
sexual warrants treating the conduct as being because of sex.  
The mechanism of harm was invariably chosen because of 
the particular power that male-female sexual abuse has in 
this society.193  Sexual harassment puts a woman in her place 
not only as a worker, but as a woman.194  Moreover, given 
the ubiquitous threat of sexual violence to women, each 
instance of sexual harassment by a man toward a woman 
reemphasizes the looming threat of sexual violence toward 
all women.195  Sexual harassment of women by men also 
reinforces a particular social message that women are 
primarily, and in all contexts, sexual objects while men are 
both social and sexual agents.196  This message is reinforced 
                                                 
193  See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 830 (1991) 
(arguing that workplace conduct that is sexual in nature is particularly 
dangerous and harmful to women). 
194  See MACKINNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN supra 
note __ at  174 ("Sexual harassment perpetuates the interlocked structure 
by which women have been kept sexually in thrall to men and at the 
bottom of the labor market.  Two forces of American society converge: 
men's control over women's sexuality and capital's control over 
employees' work lives."). 
195  See Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic 
Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L. J. 1, 33 (1999) ("The 
common law showed little ability to take into account broad socio-
historical changes like the massive influx of women into the workplace 
and showed less ability to understand that while one crude proposition 
to one woman on the job might not be earth-shattering, when thousands 
of women faced this in the workplace everyday, the series of comments 
could become a significant bar to the workplace happiness and 
advancement of women as a group.")  
196  Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment? 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 691, 693 (1997) (arguing that "the sexual harassment of a woman 
by a man is an instance of sexism precisely because the act embodies 
fundamental gender stereotypes: men as sexual conquerors and women 
as sexually conquered, men as masculine sexual subjects and women as 
feminine sexual objects").  See also MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
WORKING WOMEN 179 ("sex stereotype is present in the male attitude, 
expressed through sexual harassment, that women are sexual beings 
whose privacy and integrity can be invaded at will, beings who exist for 
men's sexual stimulation and gratification"). 
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even if it is only one or two women in each workplace, 
rather than all women in all workplaces, who are subject to 
such sexual advances.197  For these reasons, even if sexual 
conduct from a man to a woman in a particular workplace is 
itself driven by personal animosity or workplace fights 
rather than by the woman's sex per se, 198 the fact that a male 
co-worker or supervisor chooses sexuality as the mechanism 
by which to harm the woman, rather than some other 
means, should make the conduct actionable under Title 
VII.199  
This sex as subordination argument is, of course, most 
persuasive in explaining why a man’s sexual targeting of a 
woman should always be treated as a form of sex 
discrimination.  It is less clear under this argument why all 
male on male sexual targeting should also be considered so.  
Such conduct does not look like an attempt by men to 
                                                 
197  See e.g., MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 180 
("[S]exual harassment forms an integral part of the social stereotyping of 
all women as sexual objects and each individual grievant is but one 
example of it"). 
198  But see, Mark Mclaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII 
Hostile Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375, 
379-82 (1998) (arguing that often sexual harassment of women by men is 
motivated not by contempt for women as a group but disrespect or 
dislike for the woman as an individual). 
199  See MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN supra 
note __ at 177 (arguing that "[a] guarantee against discrimination 
'because of sex' has little meaning if a major traditional dynamic of 
enforcement and expression of inferior sex status is allowed to persist 
untouched"); Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment? supra note 
__ at 769 (concluding that "where a woman alleges that she has been 
sexually harassed by a man, a lower quantum of proof is sufficient to 
trigger an inference of sex discrimination because larger cultural norms 
of women as sex objects and men as sex subjects have been reproduced 
in the offending conduct").  See also, Belleville, 119 F.3d at 572 ("…the 
historic imbalance of power between men and women in the workplace 
offers a very compelling reason why the sexual harassment of a woman 
by a male superior or co-worker should be understood as sex 
discrimination."). 
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express hatred of or to degrade their own sex as a group.200  
Nor does the mechanism necessarily reinforce a sex-based 
hierarchy in which men as a group are oppressed.  
Feminist scholars have persuasively argued that at 
least some forms of male-male sexual harassment are best 
understood as efforts to maintain and protect the very same 
hetero-masculine norms that are critical to men's dominance 
over women in the workplace and that are enforced through 
the more standard variety of male-female sexual harassment.  
As Franke has argued: 
[S]exual harassment is understood as a 
mechanism by which an orthodoxy regarding 
masculinity and femininity is enforced, policed 
and perpetuated in the workplace.  
Unwelcome and offensive conduct by men 
directed at women that has the effect of 
reducing women's identity to that of a sex 
object while figuring men's identity as that of a 
sex subject is one example of gender 
subordination.  But so is the sexual harassment 
of  . . .  men who were insufficiently masculine 
and as a result were punished by their male 
coworkers with a campaign of unwelcome 
offensive, and hostile conduct of a sexual 
nature.201  
 
 Kathryn Abrams similarly views, at least some types, of 
male-male sexual harassment as a means of "asserting the 
primacy of male prerogatives or norms in the workplace"202 
                                                 
200  See e.g., Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Il. 1988) 
(dismissing the sex discrimination claim of a man who was harassed 
sexually by male co-workers because the harassment did not create an 
anti-male environment and hence was not because of sex under Title 
VII). 
201  Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?  supra note __ at 760. 
202  See Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment supra note __  
at 1209. 
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by punishing men who deviate from appropriate gender 
roles.203  
Yet, even if one finds this argument persuasive, it 
does not support a conclusion that all male-on-male 
employment discrimination that is sexual in nature is 
properly considered to be discrimination because of sex. 204  
While it may make sense, for example, to consider the sexual 
harassment of effeminate men by other men as an attempt to 
maintain traditional gender norms and, by extension, men's 
social dominance over women, there is no reason to treat 
men's sexualized harassment of a hypermasculine gay man 
in the same way.  The hypermasculine gay man is privately 
challenging norms of heterosexuality—which may, of 
course, be the reason for the harassment—but his 
harassment does not police traditional norms of 
appropriately masculine workplace behavior.  The 
subordination argument also does not justify treating male-
male sexualized harassment motivated by the target's age or 
race, or by personal animosity or workplace disputes, as 
                                                 
203  See Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject supra note __ at 
2516.  See also MacKinnon, Amici Brief in support of petitioner in Oncale, 
1997 WL 471814 (arguing that sexual harassment is used by men to keep 
other men in line and to maintain masculine dominance in the 
workplace).  See also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment 
supra note __ at 1776 (explaining that “[j]ust as dominant male workers 
may harass women who threaten their idealized image of masculinity on 
the job, they may also harass such nonconforming men. This form of 
harassment, like harassment of women workers, perpetuates job 
segregation by sex.”). 
204  Franke states, for example, that "when a gay male supervisor requests 
sexual favors of a male subordinate no larger cultural gender orthodoxy 
is being policed, perpetuated or enforced" and, as a result, such conduct 
does not constitute actionable sexual harassment.  See Franke, What’s 
Wrong With Sexual Harassment? supra note __ at 767.  Moreover, Franke 
contends that male-male harassment perpetuated by predominantly 
straight men on other straight men creating a fraternity-like culture 
permeated with sexual talk and taunts does not constitute sex 
discrimination until the "enlightened man" complains of the conduct and 
is then specifically "targeted for hostile treatment because of his failure to 
conform to the workplace norms."  Id. at 768-69. 
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being because of sex since such conduct again does not 
police or promote traditional gender roles and sex-based 
hierarchy.   
Similarly, the subordination argument does not 
justify treating an effeminate gay man's sexual harassment of 
a normatively masculine straight man as discrimination 
because of sex.  The effeminate gay man's use of sexuality to 
harm another man does not reinforce or police traditional 
gender roles that maintain men's dominance over women.  
Finally, the sex as subordination argument does not justify 
treating the sexualized harassment of a woman by another 
woman which is motivated by sexual desire (as opposed to a 
sense of inappropriate femininity) as being discrimination 
because of sex.  This harassment too, although sexual in 
nature, does not serve to reinforce gender roles and sex-
based hierarchy.  
The sex as subordination argument is not without 
persuasive power, but it does not justify treating all sexual 
conduct in the workplace as necessarily being because of sex.  
It is far too tenuous to conclude that all sexual conduct 
which targets particular women or men reinforces the sex-
based subordination of women to men and is, therefore, a 
form of sex discrimination under Title VII. 
A second reason to focus on sexual conduct relies on 
the assumption that such conduct is motivated by attraction 
and would not occur if the target was of the other sex.  As 
David Schwartz has noted, “[t]he earliest precedents 
recognizing a Title VII cause of action for sexual harassment 
relied on a sexual-desire-based notion of causation.”205  As 
with the subordination-based rationale, however, the 
attraction-based rationale can justify treating only a subset of 
the instances in which sexual conduct is used to 
disadvantage particular female or male employees as being 
because of sex.  
In practice, courts have used the attraction-based 
rationale to justify treating sexual harassment by a man 
                                                 
205  See Schwartz, supra note __  at 1719. 
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(presumed to be heterosexual) of a woman as being because 
of sex, and harassment by a man (known to be gay) of 
another man as being because of sex.206  As the Supreme 
Court explained in Oncale: 
Courts and juries have found the inference of 
discrimination easy to draw in most male-
female sexual harassment situations, because 
the challenged conduct typically involves 
explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; 
it is reasonable to assume those proposals 
would not have been made to someone of the 
same sex.  The same chain of inference would 
be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex 
harassment, if there were credible evidence 
that the harasser was homosexual.207   
 
Courts often treat other types of sexual conduct, most 
notably that by heterosexually identified men toward other 
                                                 
206  See e.g., Belleville, 119 F.3d at 577 (“The familiar notion is that a 
woman sexually harassed by a man may claim discrimination under 
Title VII because the harasser is, presumably, heterosexual and would 
not have bothered her if she were a man”); Simenton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 
33, 37 (2nd Cir. 2000) (“In the context of male-female sexual harassment, 
involving more or less explicit sexual proposals, it is easy to infer 
discrimination because of sex since ‘it is reasonable to assume those 
proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex’”) 
(citation omitted);  Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th Cir. 
1986) (“Except in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor, 
it should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based on 
sex”); Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1985) (“But for 
Horn’s womanhood, [her supervisor] would not have demanded sex as a 
condition of employment”).  See also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 & 
n. 55 (noting in dicta that sexual harassment of a man by a male co-
worker is sex discrimination if motivated by sexual attraction such that it 
would not have occurred had the target been a woman); Peric v. Bd. of 
Trustees of Univ. of Il,, 1996 WL 515175 at *3 (N.D. Il Sept. 6, 1996) (same), 
Raney v. Dist. of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D.D.C. 1995) (same), 
EEOC v. Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103-04 (M.D. Tenn. 
1995) (same). 
207  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
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men, as not being because of sex.208  Courts simply assume 
that when publicly heterosexual men act sexually toward 
women this is motivated by sexual attraction and when 
these same men act sexually toward other men it is not. 
While courts make oversimplifying assumptions 
about the binary nature of sexual desire and the meanings 
and motives of human sexual conduct, they are probably 
right in concluding that not all conduct that is sexual in 
nature is motivated by sexual desire.209  Courts have noted 
that heterosexual men may at times use sexual conduct as a 
means of expressing dislike or hostility toward another man 
without being motivated by sexual attraction toward the 
                                                 
208 See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (concluding that the verbal and physical assaults of a sexual 
nature suffered by the plaintiff did not establish actionable sexual 
harassment because they were committed by a heterosexual man against 
another heterosexual man); Mayo v. Kiwest, 1996 WL 460769 (4th Cir. Aug. 
15, 1996) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim 
because although plaintiff was subjected to verbal and physical abuse 
that was sexual in nature his attackers “were indisputably males and 
Mayo makes  no claim that either was homosexual or bisexual”); Walden 
Book Co., 885 F. Supp. at 1102 (distinguishing the actionable same-sex 
sexual harassment present in that case from the non actionable 
harassment present in Goluszek by stating: “Goluszek is clearly 
distinguishable from the instant case because Goluszek involved sexual 
teasing of a heterosexual male by other heterosexual males rather than 
sexual harassment of a subordinate by a homosexual supervisor.”). 
209  See generally Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000) (evaluating the major sex studies measuring 
the prevalence of bisexual orientation and noting that “each study found 
the incidence of bisexuality was greater than or comparable to the 
incidence of homosexuality”); Schwartz, supra note __  at 1763 (noting 
that “the notion that harassment is ‘because of sex’ when demonstrably 
based on sexual attraction posits a world of Kinsey zeroes and Kinsey 
sixes . . . in which everyone is sexually attracted either to someone of the 
opposite sex if heterosexual, or of the same sex if homosexual”); ALFRED 
C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 610-66 (1948) 
(rating heterosexuality and homosexuality on a zero to six scale and 
explaining that “nearly half (46%) of the population engages in both 
heterosexual and homosexual activities . . . in the course of their adult 
lives”). 
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target.210  It is likely that heterosexual men may also at times 
choose sexual means to harm women because these means 
are particularly hurtful and not because they are motivated 
by sexual desire.211  It is perhaps not surprising then that the 
Supreme Court in Oncale rather defensively proclaimed that 
it had “never held that workplace harassment, even 
harassment between men and women, is automatically 
discrimination because of sex merely because the words 
used have sexual content or connotations.”212  The attraction-
based rationale, either with or without the courts’ 
simplifying assumptions about the binary nature of human 
sexuality, simply cannot justify treating all discriminatory 
conduct that is sexual in nature as being because of sex.   
While the mechanism of harm approach to trait 
discrimination treats too much conduct as actionable sex 
discrimination, perhaps an even bigger problem with this 
approach is the range of conduct it misses.  Under the 
mechanism of harm approach, a woman who is singled out 
for discriminatory treatment because she is perceived as 
particularly aggressive or competitive will not have a cause 
                                                 
210  See e.g., Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1085 (holding that even though 
plaintiff's harassers used "sexually explicit, vulgar insults to express their 
anger" with the plaintiff, their harassment was caused by "acrimony over 
work-related disputes" and was not  because of plaintiff's sex); Johnson v. 
Hondo Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that sexually explicit 
remarks made by male co-workers to male plaintiff were “simply 
expressions of animosity or juvenile provocation” and were not made 
because of plaintiff’s sex).  
211  See Belleville, 119 F.3d at 590 (noting that “[m]en sexually harass 
women in the workplace for reasons other than sexual desire”).  See also 
Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment? supra note __ at 743 
(arguing that “men engage in offensive sexual conduct in the workplace 
primarily as a way to exercise or express power, not desire”); 
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN supra note __ at 
199 (“[M]ale sexual advances may often derive as much from fear and 
hatred of women and a desire to keep them in an inferior place as from 
genuine positive attraction or affection, although the perpetrator may be 
unaware of his feelings”);  Estrich, supra note __ (arguing that there is 
something particularly harmful about sexual conduct in the workplace).   
212  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
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of action if the discriminatory treatment takes the form of a 
heavier than normal workload, particularly intense 
monitoring, or denied promotions.  Women who are singled 
out because they have attributes that effectively challenge 
the sex-based hierarchy of the workplace are not entitled to 
protection under this approach unless their employer 
chooses to harm them using sexual rather than nonsexual 
means.  As Schultz has argued in the context of analyzing 
sexual harassment cases, courts’ narrow and exclusive focus 
on the sexual nature of the harassment involved misses a 
great deal of nonsexual conduct that serves to undermine 
women’s competence in the workplace and their ability to 
compete on equal terms with men.213  The mechanism of 
harm approach to trait discrimination similarly misses much 
trait discrimination that, while nonsexual in nature, 
nonetheless serves to reinforce a sex-based employment 
hierarchy.    
Just as a sexuality-focused mechanism of harm 
approach was an inadequate response to the question of 
when harassment should be considered actionable sex 
                                                 
213  Shultz contends: 
[The sexual desire-dominance paradigm] omits—and 
even obscures—many of the most prevalent forms of 
harassment that make workplaces hostile and alienating 
to workers based on their gender.  Much of what is 
harmful to women in the workplace is difficult to 
construe as sexual in design. . . . The prevailing 
paradigm, however, may also be overinclusive.  By 
emphasizing the protection of women’s sexual selves 
and sensibilities over and above their empowerment as 
workers, the paradigm permits—or even encourages—
companies to construe the law to prohibit some forms of 
sexual expression that do not promote gender hierarchy 
at work.   
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note __ at 1689.  See 
also Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L. J. 2061 (2003) 
(discussing the tendency of employers to unnecessarily sanitize the 
workplace of sexual conduct that does not undermine women’s 
competence ostensibly under the guise of Title VII’s sexual harassment 
prohibitions).  
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discrimination, so too is it an inadequate response to the 
question of when trait discrimination should be considered 
actionable sex discrimination.  Focusing only on the means 
by which certain women or men are singled out for 
discriminatory treatment—without also looking at the social 
meaning and effect of their being singled out—leads to 
treating both too much and too little trait discrimination as 
sex discrimination.  In the next section, therefore, I present 
an alternative response. 
 
V. Power/Access Approach  
The power/access approach treats as actionable sex 
discrimination only those forms of sex-specific trait 
discrimination that are based on gender norms or scripts 
that inhibit the ability of individuals of a particular sex to 
participate successfully in the work world.  Under this view, 
Title VII does not require the elimination or nonenforcement 
of all gender norms through rigidly neutral employment 
rules.  Instead, it requires the nonenforcement or elimination 
of only those gender scripts and gender norms that actually 
inhibit sex equality in the workplace.214    
Sex-specific forms of trait discrimination generally 
arise out of and reflect gender norms.  The reason an 
employer allows women but not men to wear dresses is 
because women who wear dresses are social conformists 
while men who wear dresses are not.  The power/access 
approach demands an examination of the gender norms 
driving the trait discrimination in each case.  The 
power/access approach recognizes that all gender norms are 
not created equal.  Some are far more dangerous to sex 
                                                 
214  Robert Post has offered a similar interpretation of Title VII.  Post 
explains that “customary gender norms are incorporated into the very 
meaning and texture of Title VII.  So far from striking ‘at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes,’ the statute in fact negotiates the ways in which it will shape 
and alter existing gender norms.”  Robert C. POST, PREJUDICIAL 
APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 39 
(2001).    
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equality than others.  Moreover, it also recognizes the 
significant costs both to employers and to employees that are 
likely to flow from an enforced blindness to all gender 
norms.  The power/access approach calls, therefore, for a 
necessarily context specific process of social transformation 
whereby nondiscrimination is equated not with formal 
neutrality, but with the elimination of only particularly 
harmful or limiting gender norms.215  Because the 
power/access approach determines when actionable sex 
discrimination exists not by following an abstract rule but by 
looking at the social meanings and effects of sex-specific trait 
discrimination in each instance, the approach is best 
explained through application. 
 
A. The Power/Access Approach Applied 
The following examples help illuminate the approach 
and clarify the ways in which it differs from the other 
approaches to trait discrimination discussed thus far. 
 
1. Aggressive/Masculine Women 
 The power/access approach would treat an 
employer’s discrimination against aggressive women as an 
actionable form of sex discrimination even if the employer 
had a stellar record of hiring women generally.  If employers 
were permitted to act upon the gender script equating 
aggressiveness in women with bitchiness, all women would 
be undermined in their ability to participate fully and 
successfully in the workplace.  Aggressiveness and 
                                                 
215  Another way to conceive of my approach is as requiring employers to 
change the work world to a degree, and then no farther.  Title VII 
requires employers to transform the work world so as to better fit and 
include certain types of women and men, but not others.  The line 
between those who get protection and those who do not is neither 
natural nor arbitrary, but the product of competing social concerns about 
liberty and equality.  For a similar argument made in a very different 
context see Daniel Wikler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, 8 
PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 377 (1979.  I thank Larry Alexander for 
bringing this article to my attention.  
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competitiveness are almost always required, either explicitly 
or instrumentally, for an employee to move up the corporate 
ranks.  Allowing employers to exclude aggressive, 
competitive women because such women are perceived as 
unappealing would encourage all women to adopt 
traditionally feminine, passive, and deferential attributes in 
order to avoid such discrimination.  Women with such traits, 
however, would be less likely to move up the corporate 
ladder.  To the extent employers are permitted to act on the 
norm against aggressiveness in women, women as a group 
are hindered in their ability to integrate the work world and 
end its sex-based hierarchy.  
 Consider, for example, a litigation law firm that 
promotes almost exclusively from within its own ranks.  The 
hiring partners at the firm have no problem hiring women 
and regularly hire entering classes that are fifty percent 
women.  The partners simply refuse to hire women who 
they perceive to be aggressive, loud and competitive.  The 
partners just do not like women with these personality traits, 
preferring women who are a bit more "girly," giggly, and 
deferential.  They regularly hire women from top law 
schools who fit this mold.  Despite the law firm’s frequent 
hiring of female associates, very few women are invited to 
join the partnership ranks.  In order to become an equity 
partner in the firm a candidate must have a reputation as a 
tough and aggressive litigator and be able to bring business 
into the firm.  By the time associates reach the firm’s six year 
up or out deadline, significantly fewer female associates 
than male associates have these attributes.  Without any 
discrimination taking place at the time of the partnership 
decision, far fewer women than men are promoted to 
partner at the firm.  
The Supreme Court recognized just such a catch-22 in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.  Ann Hopkins could not meet 
the objective qualifications for partnership without being 
personally aggressive, yet the perception of aggressiveness 
as unappealing disqualified her.  The Court rightly 
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concluded in that case that discrimination against aggressive 
women constituted actionable sex discrimination.  The 
power/access approach, however, better articulates the 
concerns motivating this judgment than did the trait equality 
logic the court in fact relied upon.    
 
2. Effeminate/Nurturing Men 
The power/access approach would also treat 
discrimination against effeminate men as an actionable form 
of sex discrimination.  As numerous scholars have argued, 
discrimination against effeminate men is often a means of 
policing gender roles in the workplace and reaffirming 
gender scripts that discourage men from engaging in 
nurturing and caregiving activities.216  Such discrimination 
pushes men to act in hyper masculine and traditionally 
macho ways.  While such role policing certainly confines 
men, it also undermines women’s ability to compete 
successfully in the workplace.  Enforcing a code of 
hypermasculinity on male employees reinforces women's 
position as different and other.  Moreover, hypermasculinity 
defines itself not only as different from that which is female 
but as distinctly superior to it.  Men exclude and harass 
other men who seem too feminine in order to emphasize not 
only their difference from but their dominance over that 
which is feminine.217  Allowing employers to discriminate 
against effeminate men reinforces gender norms by which 
male workers are defined in large part by their superiority 
                                                 
216  See e.g., Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment? supra note __ 
at 760; Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment supra note __  
at 1205; Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject supra note __  at 
2516; Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment supra note __  at 1776.   
217 Catharine MacKinnon, for example, analyzes both the cause and 
desired effect of the harassment of a gender deviant man by his male co-
workers as follows: "Goluszek was punished, ostracized, insulted, and 
forced to consume pornography to make him conform to [his male co-
workers'] stereotype of how a man should be a man by subordinating 
women sexually."  MacKinnon, Amici Brief in Oncale, 1997 WL 471814 at 
*10-11, referring to Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Il. 1988).  
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over their female co-workers.  Women will not be able to 
compete effectively or fairly in the work world as long as 
norms defining men as opposite and superior to women are 
reinforced.  
The power/access approach would for similar 
reasons protect male employees from being discriminated 
against for displaying nurturing or caregiving behavior that 
female employees are permitted to engage in.  Imagine a 
male kindergarten teacher who is fired for exhibiting the 
same kind of nurturing behavior that female teachers 
regularly display with their students, and a male lawyer 
who is terminated for arranging his work schedule to engage 
in caregiving activities that his female colleagues routinely 
schedule their work around.  The power/access approach 
would prohibit both types of trait discrimination because 
both stem from and reinforce gender scripts which treat 
nurturing and caregiving activities as appropriate and 
laudable only for women.  As long as such norms are 
enforced and men are discouraged from being nurturing and 
engaging in caregiving, women will continue to be 
responsible for the bulk of these responsibilities.  As long as 
women continue to be dominantly responsible for these life 
sustaining activities they will not be able to compete fully 
and fairly with men in the public sphere.  
 
3. Men in Dresses 
 The power/access approach to trait discrimination 
would not treat as an actionable form of sex discrimination 
an employer's refusal to hire men who wear dresses to work 
(or high heels, or lipstick) while not objecting to women 
engaged in the same behavior.  Certainly, allowing 
employers to act on gender norms frowning upon men in 
dresses encourages discrimination against cross-dressing 
men.  Yet eradicating this particular gender norm is not 
necessary for the substantive equality of women and men in 
the work world.  Men are not excluded from matching the 
ideal worker by being prevented from wearing dresses.  The 
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ideal worker looks like a man in a suit.  Women, likewise, 
are not harmed by having male employees’ clothing choices 
limited in a way theirs is not.  Female employees may still 
mimic the ideal male style or choose to dress in a way that is 
more gender specific. 
If employers were not permitted to adopt such a sex-
specific “no men in skirts” work rule, they might, of course, 
choose to permit both men and women to wear skirts.  
Alternatively, and I have argued more likely, they would 
simply not permit either sex to wear skirts.  Women and 
male cross-dressers then both lose.  However, even, if 
employers responded to a prohibition on sex-specific trait 
discrimination by permitting men to wear dresses, it is 
unlikely that this would improve the status or ability of 
women to compete.  Women seeking to be viewed as 
competent and to be taken seriously in the work world seem 
to benefit from downplaying rather than highlighting 
gender differences.218  If a very large number of men began 
wearing dresses to work, women might reap some benefits 
from their easy fit within the new clothing norms.  Such a 
wave of men in women's clothes is, however, unlikely.  It is 
more likely that even if men were permitted to wear dresses, 
workplace clothing norms would remain essentially the 
same—a masculine version of androgyny.219  Indeed, men in 
dresses might serve only to emphasize the nonnormativity 
of feminine dress that is usually, although not exclusively, 
associated with women.  Allowing men to wear dresses 
might actually serve to heighten workplace gender norms 
                                                 
218  See Sandra Monk Forsythe, Mary Frances Drake, and Charles A. Cox, 
Jr., Dress As An Influence on the Perceptions of Management Characteristics in 
Women, 13 HOME ECONOMICS RESEARCH J. 112 (1984) (explaining that 
personnel administrators found female applicants for managerial 
positions to be least forceful, self-reliant, dynamic, aggressive, and 
decisive when they wore distinctly feminine clothing as compared to 
more masculinely styled outfits); see also Sandra Forsythe, Mary Frances 
Drake, and Charles A. Cox, Influence of Applicant's Dress on Interviewer's 
Selection Decisions, 70 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 374 (1985). 
219  Case, supra note __ at 7. 
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even while blurring somewhat the equation of gender with 
sex.   
 
4. Women in Pants 
 In contrast, the power/access approach would treat 
an employer’s policy of prohibiting women from wearing 
pants while allowing/requiring men to do so as a form of 
sex discrimination.  The gender norm such trait 
discrimination rests upon not only emphasizes women’s 
difference from men and the ideal worker norm, but also 
emphasizes their sexuality.    Men continue to dominate the 
upper echelons of the work world, and workplace norms for 
both clothing and behavior continue to be, as Case described 
them, "androgynous slanting toward the masculine."220  
Requiring women to wear skirts emphasizes their difference 
from men and from normative workplace behavior more 
generally.  Moreover, such a requirement emphasizes 
women’s femininity which may itself undermine their 
perceived professional competence.221  Allowing employers 
to act upon the gender script that women belong in skirts 
prevents women from mimicking the normative dress code 
of the ideal worker, maximizing their perceived competence, 
and thereby optimizing their ability to compete as effectively 
as possible against men in the work world.222 
 
5. The Sexually Harassed Woman/Man 
 As discussed in Part I, sexualized harassment of 
women may sometimes be a form of ontological 
discrimination—if all women in a workplace are harassed—
and at other times a form of trait discrimination—if only 
particular women in a workplace are  harassed.  The 
                                                 
220  Case, supra note __ at 7. 
221  See Forsythe, Drake, and Cox, supra note __ . 
222  There has in fact been some legislative protection for women to wear 
pants.  See Cal. Gov't Code §12947.5(a) (Deering 1995) (providing that "It 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to 
permit an employee to wear pants on account of the sex of the 
employee."). 
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harassment may look like a form of sex-specific trait 
discrimination to the extent that women are being singled 
out for harassment because of a particular trait—e.g. 
physical attractiveness or professional aggressiveness—for 
which men are not treated adversely.  The discrimination 
looks different from the other forms of sex-specific trait 
discrimination discussed in that it does not involve a formal 
employment requirement, yet the discrimination may still 
act so as to informally exclude or disadvantage particular 
types of women or men.  
The power/access approach calls for treating 
sexualized harassment of women by men as actionable sex 
discrimination in all cases because of the method of 
discrimination chosen, irregardless of its underlying cause.  
Sexual violence by men against women is historically 
pervasive.223  Sexual violence and the fear of sexual violence 
keeps women passive, circumscribed in their movements, 
and dependent upon men for protection.224  When a man 
                                                 
223  See e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 169 (1987) 
(arguing that “[r]ape, battery, sexual harassment, forced prostitution, 
and the sexual abuse of children emerge as common and systematic,” 
and citing studies showing that up to 44 percent of American women 
will be raped in their lifetime, and thirty-eight percent of girls are 
sexually molested inside or outside the family); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 633 (2000) (Souter dissent) (referring to evidence presented 
before Congress in support of the Violence Against Women Act that 
“’[a]ccording to one study, close to half a million girls now in high school 
will be raped before they graduate” and “’[one hundred twenty-five 
thousand] college women can expect to be raped during this—or any—
year’”) (internal citations omitted). 
224  See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal 
Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 539  (1993) (arguing that 
“street harassment severely restricts the physical and geographical 
mobility of women.  It not only diminishes a woman’s feelings of safety 
and comfort in public places, but also restricts her freedom of movement, 
depriving her of liberty and security in the public sphere”).  See also 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 633 (2000) (Souter dissent) 
(referring to evidence to Congress in support of the Violence Against 
Women that “’[t]hree-quarters of women never go to the movies alone 
after dark because of the fear of rape and nearly 50 percent do not use 
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chooses sex as a means to hurt a woman he is taking 
advantage of and reinforcing a gender script whereby 
women are sexual victims vulnerable to attack by some men 
and dependent on others for protection.  It does not matter, 
therefore, why certain women are singled out for abuse.  The 
fact that sexuality is used as the means to harm some women 
reinforces a gender script that inhibits the social freedom 
and workplace equality of all women.225  
In contrast, the targeting and sexualized harassment 
of certain men by other men in the workplace does not 
warrant the same categorical treatment as sex discrimination 
under the power/access approach.  Instead, closer 
inspection is required into the cause for the harassment in 
each case. 
Male-male sexualized harassment does not by its very 
nature reinforce a sex-based hierarchy in the way that male-
female sexualized harassment does.  Often such harassment 
does serve as a way to police gender roles and to reinforce 
gender hierarchy by punishing men who do not behave in 
appropriately masculine (and non feminine) ways.  But 
male-male sexual harassment is not always about policing 
gender roles and does not always do so.  At times such 
abuse may be chosen as a way to punish a gender 
                                                                                                             
public transit alone after dark for the same reason’”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
225  Bowman has made a similar argument about the significance and 
impact of men’s street harassment of women.  Bowman argues: 
[A]ny incident of harassment, no matter how 
“harmless,” both evokes and reinforces women’s 
legitimate fear of rape.  It does so by reminding women 
that they are vulnerable to attack and by demonstrating 
that any man may choose to invade a woman’s personal 
space, physically or psychologically, if he feels like it.  
Thus, street harassment forms part of a whole spectrum 
of means by which men objectify women and assert 
coercive power over them, one which is even more 
invidious because it is so pervasive and appears, 
deceptively, to be trivial. 
Bowman, see supra note __ at 540. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15
 
 
TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX  DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
 
 97
conforming man for other reasons—e.g. a workplace or 
personal dispute.  In such instances, sexual means are 
chosen because they are particularly hurtful, but the 
mechanism does not in such instances, in and of itself, 
reinforce a sex-based hierarchy. 
Therefore, unlike in male-female sexualized 
harassment cases, in cases involving male-male sexualized 
harassment, labeling the harassment as a form of sex 
discrimination requires an exploration into the actual cause 
for the harassment.  To the extent the victims are being 
singled out because of their effeminacy, then the harassment 
looks  like an actionable form of sex-specific trait 
discrimination—namely discrimination against effeminate 
men.  To the extent, however, that the harassment seems to 
be based on and driven by personal or professional 
animosity toward the targeted men, then the discrimination 
does not seem to be motivated by a particular gender norm,  
nor does it seem to be in anyway because of sex.  
Harassment should not be treated as actionable sex 
discrimination solely because one man chooses to express 
his dislike for another through sexual means.  Such means 
should certainly be prohibited by employers, but they do not 
translate all expressions of male-male hostility into 
manifestations of sex discrimination. 
 
6. The Gay Man/Lesbian Woman 
 Sometimes an employer will freely hire both women 
and men but simply refuse to hire women and men who are, 
or are believed to be, gay.  Clearly such discrimination is 
trait-based in the sense that neither all women nor all men 
are excluded, but only those with a particular trait.  
Characterizing the discrimination as sex-specific or sex-
neutral is, however, more difficult and highlights the 
fuzziness of the distinction.  An employer could frame its 
policy in a sex-neutral way as: “No gays allowed.”  
Alternatively, an employer, or more likely a legal academic, 
could frame its discrimination in a sex-specific way as: “No 
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women who have sex with women.  No men who have sex 
with men.”  Framing the discrimination in this sex-specific 
and non neutral way leads to the conclusion that the 
discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under the trait 
equality approach.  Such a conclusion does not, however, 
follow under the power/access approach.   
 The requirement that a woman cannot have sex with 
a woman while a man can have sex with a woman is 
certainly based on a gender norm of appropriate social and 
sexual behavior for women.  Proper femininity requires 
social and sexual attachment to men.  Moreover, allowing 
employers to act on this gender norm regarding appropriate 
female behavior reinforces a particular social hierarchy.  Yet 
it is the hierarchy of straight women over gay women rather 
the hierarchy of men over women.  This distinction is 
critical.  There are good reasons to prohibit employers from 
acting on gender norms equating proper femininity (or 
masculinity) with heterosexuality and deviant femininity (or 
masculinity) with homosexuality.  Acting on these norms 
reinforces the hierarchy of straight over gay.  Acting on 
these norms does not, however, reinforce the particular caste 
hierarchy that Title VII was aimed at. 226 
I have here distinguished conceptually between 
discrimination against gay men and lesbians which I argue is 
not properly conceived of as sex discrimination and 
discrimination against effeminate men and masculine 
women which I argue is.  As a practical matter, it is, of 
course, often difficult to distinguish between discrimination 
because of sexual orientation and discrimination because of 
                                                 
226  See generally Stein, supra note __ at 503 (arguing that “Laws restricting 
the rights of gay men and lesbians violate principles of equality 
primarily because such laws discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation, not because they discriminate on the basis of sex”); Cheshire 
Calhoun, Separating Lesbian Theory from Feminist Theory, 104 ETHICS 558, 
562 (1994) (contending that “patriarchy and heterosexual dominance are 
two, in principle, separable systems.  Even where they work together, it 
is possible conceptually to puss the patriarchal aspect of male-female 
relationships apart from their heterosexual dimensions”). 
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gender nonconformity.  Discrimination by men against other 
men in the workplace often seems to be about both, or seems 
to at least blend one with the other.  In cases in which gender 
nonconformity and homosexuality are both at issue, the 
discrimination should be treated as actionable under Title 
VII.  The fact that discrimination may be motivated in part 
by homosexual status should not strip discrimination based 
on gender nonconformity of its protected status.  However, 
the mere fact that a gay person is targeted for discrimination 
does not in and of itself warrant treating the conduct as sex 
discrimination under the power/access approach. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that the distinction I draw 
between actionable and non actionable trait discrimination 
does not depend on the mutability of the trait at issue.  I 
have argued that discrimination based on aggressiveness in 
women is actionable while discrimination based on a man's 
cross-dressing is not.  It is not at all clear, however, that it is 
any more difficult for an aggressive woman to change and 
soften her mannerisms than it is for a man drawn to cross-
dressing to change his mode of attire.  Both traits are 
probably fairly mutable.  My distinction also does not 
depend on whether discrimination based on a particular 
trait is likely to be random and idiosyncratic or systemic and 
socially prevalent.  Men in dresses, for example, probably 
face more consistent workplace discrimination than do 
aggressive/masculine women.  Instead, my distinction 
between actionable and non actionable trait discrimination 
relies on a determination about whether the discrimination 
arises out of particular gender norms and scripts that society 
must change in order to dismantle a sex-based hierarchy in 
the work world.  In the next section I provide a more 
expansive defense of this approach. 
   
B. A More Expansive Defense  
The power/access approach to trait discrimination 
recognizes that sometimes an employer who freely hires 
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women (or men) may still discriminate against a subset of 
women (or men) in such a way as to reinforce a caste-like 
hierarchy of men over women in the workplace. The 
approach in effect responds to sex-specific forms of trait 
discrimination in the same way the disparate impact 
doctrine responds to sex-neutral forms of trait 
discrimination: by focusing on whether the trait 
requirements act as “build-in headwinds” to the effective 
participation of members of a protected group.227  
By focusing on the source and effect of particular 
types of sex-specific trait discrimination, the power/access 
approach avoids the underinclusiveness problems of the 
immutable trait/fundamental right, group-identity, and 
mechanism of harm approaches.  It also avoids the 
overinclusiveness problems of the trait equality approach.   
In practice, the power/access approach and the trait 
equality approach will usually reach the same results, 
treating most instances of sex-specific trait discrimination as 
impermissible sex discrimination.  It is simply the case that 
most gender norms do normalize female weakness and male 
dominance in a way antithetical to sex equality in the 
workplace.  However, the fact that the power/access 
approach responds to the problem of sex- specific trait 
discrimination with a socially contingent standard rather 
than with a formal rule is theoretically and practically 
significant.  Theoretically, the power/access approach 
                                                 
227  In Griggs the Supreme Court invalidated the employer's requirements 
of a high school diploma and the passing of a standardized general 
intelligence test in order to be hired for certain jobs on the grounds that 
the requirements disproportionately excluded African American 
workers.  The Court explained that "good intent or absence of 
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or 
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority 
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."  401 U.S. at 433.  
As I have discussed previously, disparate impact and disparate 
treatment analyses of trait discrimination may also be similar in that the 
question of whether the trait is one that matters enough to warrant legal 
protection is at the core of both frameworks.  See supra note __. 
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reflects the intuition that nondiscrimination between the 
sexes requires something other than rigid neutrality.  It 
conceives of nondiscrimination as being about the substance 
of gender norms and the social way in which gender is 
constructed and played out, rather than about the existence 
of gender differences per se.  Practically, the fact that the 
power/access approach allows for the possibility of some 
sex-specific job requirements means that employers will feel 
less pressure to mandate a narrowly homogenous, 
androgynous work place.   
 
Conclusion: 
This paper began by emphasizing the differences 
between ontological and trait based discrimination.  The two 
are distinct in important ways.  Ontological discrimination 
in which all women (or all men) are categorically excluded 
or disadvantaged is clearly “because of” sex.  Trait 
discrimination, of either a sex-neutral or sex-specific variety, 
in which only a subset of women or men are excluded, is less 
clearly so.   
Yet, as this paper has suggested, ontological 
discrimination and sex-specific trait discrimination are 
conceptual cousins.  While ontological discrimination is 
often based on an allegiance to gender roles and a belief that 
women (or men) simply do not belong in certain places, sex-
specific trait discrimination too often stems from gender 
norms or scripts dictating appropriate and inappropriate 
behavior for women (or men).  Just as Title VII clearly 
prohibits employers from acting on social gender roles that 
call for the blanket exclusion of all women or men from 
particular jobs, so should title VII prohibit employers from 
acting on gender norms or scripts which, in perhaps more 
complex and subtle ways, make it more difficult for 
individuals of one sex or the other to participate effectively 
in the work world.  The power/access approach demands 
just such a focus.  It treats as actionable sex discrimination 
those forms, and only those forms, of sex-specific trait 
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discrimination grounded on gender norms and scripts that a 
society concerned about substantive equality must be 
invested in changing. 
The core contention of this paper has been that some 
sex-specific employment requirements should be permitted 
and that nondiscrimination does not require rigid sex 
neutrality.  Given the controversial nature of this claim, it is 
worth recognizing and responding to the two distinct ways 
in which my argument may be read and understood.  One 
could view my argument as reflecting a perfectionist belief 
in the importance for human flourishing of maintaining 
gender roles and differences.  The argument would be that I 
allow employers to act upon some gender differences 
because I think maintaining gender roles is, at least to some 
degree, good for individuals.  I am not, as a general matter, 
opposed to courts interpreting social legislation based on 
some underlying perfectionist beliefs.  Indeed, I have argued 
elsewhere that significant areas of civil rights law cannot be 
understood without recognizing a covert perfectionism 
driving the decisions.228  As I stated at the outset, however,  
my approach in this paper is better understood, not as a 
perfectionist argument, but as a pragmatically liberal effort 
at statutory interpretation.  Title VII seeks to end caste-like 
sex hierarchy in the workplace.  It should, therefore, prohibit 
employers from acting, in either an ontological or trait-based 
way, on gender norms that reinforce such hierarchy.  Yet not 
all gender norms are created equal and not every gender 
difference should be equated with gender inequality.   
The courts, as it turns out, have generally gotten these 
cases right.  Courts seem to be applying something of a 
“sniff test” to cases of sex-specific trait discrimination.   They 
treat discrimination against women with small children as 
actionable sex discrimination, along with discrimination 
                                                 
228  See Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX’s Sex-
Based Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions 
Defensible? 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731 (2003); Yuracko, Private Nurses and 
Playboy Bunnies, supra note __.  
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15
 
 
TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX  DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
 
 103
against aggressive women, and that against effeminate men.  
Yet, for reasons not fully articulated, they refuse to treat as 
actionable discrimination against men in dresses.  These 
decisions may at first look inconsistent and unprincipled.  
When viewed through the lens of the power/access 
approach, however, they become coherent.  In other words, 
the courts seem to be intuiting what the power/access 
approach makes explicit—namely that while Title VII 
certainly requires a social transformation, the transformation 
called for need not result in a homogenized and genderless 
workplace. 
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
